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LIMITING THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER: 
NEW ROLES FOR THE PROSECUTOR 
AND THE GRAND JURY 
Richard B. Kuhns'» 
T wo factors distinguish the courts' criminal contempt power1 from the power to prosecute individuals for ordinary criminal 
violations. The first and most important distinction is that the 
contempt power, in theory, is inherent in the courts and therefore 
not dependent upon legislative authorization.2 The rationale for 
an inherent judicial contempt power is necessity: A court must 
have the power, as an incident of its existence, to protect itself 
against abuses and to vindicate its authority.3 The second distinc-
tion, a corollary of the inherent power doctrine, is that courts may 
exercise the contempt power in a relatively summary manner. Some 
contempts are summary in the sense that the court may charge and 
convict the contemnor without any prior notice or hearing.4 This 
departure from traditional notions of due process is justified on the 
ground that the court must act immediately in order to vindicate 
its authority.5 Other contempts are summary only in the sense that 
the contemnor, while entitled to prior notice and hearing, is. not 
entitled to all of the procedural protections available in ordinary 
criminal prosecutions. 6 In these cases the asserted justification for 
• Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University. A.B. 1964, LL.B. 1967, Stanford University; LL.M. 1974, University of 
Michigan. 
The author is deeply grateful to Professor Jerold Israel for his thoughtful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article. 
Research for this paper was made possible by an NDEA Fellowship and a gen• 
erous grant from the William W. Cook Endowment Fund. 
1. For the distinctions between criminal and civil contempt, see text at notes 149-73 
infra. 
2, Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &: Omaha Ry., 
266 U.S. 42 (1924); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1837), See generally 
J. Fox, THE HlsTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT 
POWER (1963); 1 NATIONAL COMMN. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAws, 'WORKING 
PAPERS 601-03, 643 (1970) [hereinafter WoRIUNG PAPERS]. 
3. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 
221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). 
4. See, e.g., Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1969); United States 
v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949). 
5. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1965). 
6. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 184-87 (1958). But cf, Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 194, 201-08 (1968). 
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treating criminal contempts differently from ordinary criminal 
prosecutions is that the inherent nature of the contempt power gives 
the contempt offense a sui generis character.7 
This article will briefly describe the development and scope of 
the law of criminal contempt,8 and then tum to the question of 
whether the current exercise of the power is consistent with the 
rationale for its existence. The analysis will suggest not only that the 
answer to this question in many instances is negative, but also that 
substantial benefits would result from requiring that criminal con-
tempts be treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions. 
At the outset, it is important to note three limitations on the 
scope of this article. First, analysis is limited primarily to situations 
in which some form of prior notice and hearing is required before 
applying a criminal contempt sanction. Second, although the crimi-
nal contempt sanction may be invoked to deal with such diverse 
conduct as disruption of judicial proceedings,9 violations of orders 
prohibiting dissemination of pre-trial information,10 violations of 
7. See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924); United States v. Barnett, 346 
F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965). 
8. Several Supreme Court opinions deal at length with the nature and scope of 
the contempt power. E.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-219 (1958) (Black, 
J., dissenting); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 23-42 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); cases cited note 150 infra. · 
Although slightly dated in parts, the best contemporary work on the law of con-
tempt is R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2. See also J. Fox, supra note 2; Dobbs, Contempt 
of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 183 (1971); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of 
Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A 
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1010 (1924); Note, Procedures for 
Trying Contempts in the Federal Courts, 73 HARv, L. R.Ev. 353 (1959). 
The contempt power includes the power to impose both criminal and civil con-
tempt sanctions. However, except for pointing out that adoption of the recommen-
dations made here will have the benefit of eliminating confusion that sometimes 
exists over whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal, see text at notes 149-75 
infra, this article deals solely with the criminal contempt power. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 
851 (1949). See generally N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER rn THE COURT (1973). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), on remand,.349 
F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), afjd., 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 
(1973). 
In England, the contempt power is commonly used to deal with prejudiciai or 
unflattering publications about judicial proceedings. See generally G. BoRRIE & N. 
LOWE, THE LAW OF CONTEMPT (1973). However, in the United States the availability 
of the contempt sanction for this purpose is limited by the first amendment. See 
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). On 
the problem of balancing the rights of fair trial and free press, see A. FRIENDLY & 
R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBUCITY (1967); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication 
in the United States, 28 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 401 (1928); Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States on the Operation of the Jury System, Recommendations 
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969). 
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labor injunctions,11 and failure to pay alimony or support,12 the 
analysis and recommendations made here rest in part on practical 
considerations that are explored in only one setting: the refusal of a 
witness to testify.13 The article suggests that these practical con-
siderations are probably the same in nonwitness cases, but no 
attempt is made to verify this hypothesis. Instead, the article sets 
forth alternative methods for implementing its proposals that take 
into account the possible inapplicability of these practical consid-
erations to some types of contumacious conduct. Finally, because 
both the substantive and procedural aspects of contempt vary some-
what among jurisdictions,14 the discussion is limited to federal 
practice. Nonetheless, the principles and recommendations set forth 
here should be generally applicable to both state and federal juris-
dictions. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE 
EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER 
A. The· Substaritive Scope of the Power 
The first significant challenge in this country to the exercise of 
criminal contempt power grew out of a federal judge's decision in 
1826 to punish without prior notice or hearing an individual who 
had published an article critical of pending judicial proceedings. 
The public furor over this perceived abuse of power led to the 
impeachment of the judge, James Peck.1ti Although Peck was ulti-
mately acquitted, the incident moved Congress in 1831 to limit the 
categories of conduct subject to the courts' contempt power.10 Those 
. 11. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See Bartosic & Lanoff, 
Escalating the Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REV, 255 
(1972). 
12. See, e.g., Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938 (1961). See H. CLARK, 
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 465-71 (1968), 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971). 
14. Compare D'Auria & Corcoran, Statutes of New York and Some Aspects of Crim-
inal Contempt Proceedings, 6 NEW ENG, L. REv. 163 (1971); Ellis, The Contempt 
Powers of Tennessee Courts, 37 TENN. L. REv. 538 (1970); Ricketts, Direct Contempt 
in Oklahoma, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 359 (1973); Snepp, The Law of Contempt in North 
Carolina, 7 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. I (1970). See also Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 1258 (1963) 
(relationship benveen perjury and contempt in various jurisdictions). 
15. A full transcript of the impeachment proceedings before the House and the 
Senate appears in A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833). 
16. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (19'70). 
After defining the courts' contempt power, the 1831 act, in section 2, treated other 
obstructions of justice as ordinary criminal offenses. Section 2, as amended, is now 
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970). See United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969). For 
the legislative history of section 401, see 7 CoNG. DEB. 560-61 (1831), quoted in Frank• 
furter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1026 n.75. See also Green v. United States, 356 
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limitations are now set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 401, which provides that 
a federal court may "punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discre-
tion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as (1) [m]is-
behavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to ob-
struct the administration of justice . . . [ and] (3) [ d]isobedience or 
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or com-
mand."17 
The Supreme Court, while continuing to maintain that the 
exercise of judicial contempt power is not dependent upon legisla-
tive authorization,18 has recognized that to some extent Congress 
may regulate the power,19 and section 401 has been viewed as an 
appropriate legislative regulation.20 This judicial deference to 
section 401 has manifested itself primarily in two contexts. First, 
the Supreme Court has held that to fall within section 401(1) the 
misbehavior must occur within the geographic proximity of the 
court.21 Second, although several reported cases have upheld with-
out discussion the combined sanction of a fine and a prison sen-
tence,22 the Supreme Court23 and most lower courts24 have adhered 
to section 4Ol's limitation of the penalty to fine or imprisonment.25 
U.S. 165, 168-73 (1958); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45-49 (1941); United States 
v. Essex, 40? F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 20-22; Frankfurter 
&: Landis, supra, at 1024-38; Nelles &: King, supra note 10, at 525-32. 
17. Section 401(2) permits a court to punish "[m]isbehavior of any of its officers 
in their official transactions • • • ." Contempt charges are rarely based on section 
401(2), which has been narrowly interpreted by the Supreme Court. See Cammer v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1~56) (attorney is not an officer of the court). 
18. See cases cited note 2 supra. 
19. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &: Omaha Ry., 
266 U.S. 42 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904). 
20. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 203-04 (1968); Nye v. United States, 313 
U.S. 33, 4?-48 (1941); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904). 
21. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). The contempt, however, need not 
occur in the presence of a judge. For example, the grand jury is considered an arm 
of the court, and contumacious conduct before it has been held to satisfy the presence 
requirement of section 401(1). See, e.g., Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st 
Cir. 1954) (dictum); In re Michael, 146 F.2d 627 (3d Cir.), revd. on other grounds, 326 
U.S. 224 (1945); In re Ellison, 133 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943); 
Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 651 (1940). 
22. E.g., United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969). 
23. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943). 
24. E.g., Philipps v. United States, 45? F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Temple, 872 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 961 (1967); Carter v. 
United States, 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943). Cf. MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 
149, 154 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956). 
25. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1970), which provides a statutory right to jury trial and 
limits the potential contempt penalty to six months' imprisonment or $1,000, or both, 
in cases in which (1) the conduct constitutes a criminal offense under some statute 
other than section 401, and (2) the contempt (a) does not occur in the presence of the 
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B. Criminal Contempt Procedures 
For contempts falling within section 401, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure retain the prior judicial practice26 of denying 
prior notice and hearing only when the contemnor's conduct occurs 
in the immediate view of the judge. Rule 42(a) provides that a 
criminal contempt "may be punished summarily if the judge certifies 
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and 
that it occurred in the actual presence of the court."27 All other 
contempts are governed by rule 42(b), which requires prior notice 
and hearing. 
Occasionally notice is given by the return of a grand jury indict-
ment, and no court has disapproved this practice.28 Rule 42(b), 
court or so near thereto as to constitute an obstruction of justice and (b) is not com• 
mitted in violation of a lawful order issued in an action brought in behalf of the United 
States. 
26. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). Cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
517 (1925). 
27. FED. R. CRIM. P, 42: 
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if 
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt 
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of con-
tempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of 
record. 
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as 
provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice 
shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the 
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the 
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given 
orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on appli• 
cation of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for 
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant 
is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides, 
He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt 
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified 
from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon 
a verdict or finding of gnilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment, 
It is important to note that rule 42 is solely procedural. Confusion over this point 
occasionally arises because much contempt litigation concerns the appropriate scope 
of the summary procedures authorized by rule 42(a) rather than the substantive con-
tent of the offense. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), 
28. See United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir. 1971) (contention 
that use of indictment violates rule 42 without merit); United States v. Stcrnman, 
415 F.2d 1165, 1168 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970) (implicit approval 
of use of indictment by rejection of contention that notice in indictment was insuf• 
ficient). Cf. United States v. Consolidated Productions, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971); United States v. Cantillon, 309 F. Supp. 700 (C.D. Cal, 1970). 
There is also limited precedent for utilization of an information to initiate crim• 
inal contempt proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg,, 72 F. Supp. 
819 (W.D. Mo. 1947). However, the use of an information has not received explicit 
judicial approval, and in some instances the information has been treated merely as 
the equivalent of an application for an order to show cause rather than as an inde-
pendent initiating document. Cf., e.g., O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 681 
(8th Cir. 1942), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 
U.S. 412 (1943). 
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however, makes no reference to this method of initiating criminal 
contempt proceedings, and instead provides that notice shall be 
given orally by the judge or by a written order of arrest or-as is 
usually the case29-by an order to show cause. 
Formerly, despite rule 42(b)'s limitations on the power to punish 
contempts ·without notice and hearing, grand jury witnesses who 
refused to testify were often denied even these minimal rights 
through the simple expedient of convening the grand jury in the 
judge's presence and having the witness repeat his refusal. The 
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned this practice in 1959,30 but 
reversed itself six years later in Harris v. United States.31 In Harris 
the Court noted that the summary procedures under rule 42(a) 
should be reserved for exceptional cases of misconduct that require 
immediate judicial action,82 and most courts have interpreted rule 
42(a) narrowly in cases subsequent to Harris.83 The Court's recent 
holding in United States v. Wilson that rule 42(a) can be used to 
punish a witness who refuses to testify at trial, although the refusal 
is neither disrespectful nor physically disruptive,84 may, however, 
signal a reversal of this trend. 
29. See, e.g., Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384: U.S. 373 (1966); Green v. United States, 
356 U.S. 165 (1958). Cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925). 
30. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). · 
31. 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
32. 382 U.S. at 164 (e.g., "acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or 
obstructing court proceedings"). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Mayberry 
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Ciraolo v. Madigan, 443 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1971). 
34. No. 73-1162 (U.S., May 19, 1975). 
Although the First Circuit had reached the same conclusion, Baker v. Eisenstadt, 
456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972), the Second Circuit, 
relying on Harris, had held that rule 42(a) could not be used to punish a witness' 
orderly refusal to testify during a trial. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 
1973), reud. No. 73-1162 (U.S., May 19, 1975); United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196 
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. Taylor v. Hayes, 
418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
In Wilson, the Court distinguished Harris on the theory that there is a greater need 
for immediate action to coerce testimony in a trial setting than in a grand jury setting: 
"Harris ••• recognized • • • that summary punishment may be necessary where a 
'refusal [is] ••• an open serious threat to orderly procedure.' [H]ere [the refusall 
plainly constituted a literal 'breakdown' of the prosecutor's case." No. 73-1162, slip. op. 
at 9-10. But, cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (coercive purpose of 
contempt action renders it civil rather than criminal). The Court also noted that rule 42 
was "a restatement of the law existing when the rule was adopted" and that "the law 
at that time allowed summary punishment for refusals to testify.'' No. 73-1162, slip. 
•u& . 
For an excellent discussion of pre-Wilson Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope 
of rule 42(a), see United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For the view 
that the rule 42(a) summary criminal contempt power should be abolished, see N. 
DORSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 232-38. For the proposition that due process 
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Criminal contempt cases outside the scope of rule 42(a) have 
focused on the applicability of specific procedural guarantees avail-
able in ordinary criminal prosecutions. As early as 1822 the Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized that there were substantial similarities 
between criminal contempts and other crimes.36 In 1911 the Court 
held that an individual charged with criminal contempt is pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that he has the right not to be a witness against himself.36 Three 
years later, noting that criminal contempt is a crime unless "we are 
in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that 
word has been understood in English speech," the Court held that 
criminal contempt was an "offense" for the purposes of a three-year 
statute of limitations applicable to all "criminal offenses."37 In 1925 
the Court held that, unless the contempt occurs in the immediate 
view of the court, the contemnor is entitled to prior notice, a hear-
ing, representation by counsel, and the opportunity to present and 
examine witnesses.38 Other cases have held that the rules of evidence 
for criminal trials apply to criminal contempts,30 and that the con-
temnor has the right to a public trial before an impartial judge,40 
a bill of particulars,41 and the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses.42 
Nevertheless, the analogy between criminal contempts and crim-
requires notice and hearing in all criminal contempt cases, sec Note, Summary Punish-
ment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing 
Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 5. CAL. L. R.Ev. 463 (1966); Brief for Petitioner at 
47-58, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). 
35. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42-43 (1822), Cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 194 (1968); New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874); 
Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743 (8th Cir. 1916). 
36. Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). Cf. Nilva v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); United States v. Jose, 63 F. 951 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1891). 
37. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604-, 610 (1914). Cf. Pendergast v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943). 
The statute of limitations for criminal contempt actions is now five years unlcss 
the contempt is instituted pursuant to 18 U.5.C. § 402, see note 25 supra, in wl1ich 
case the period is one year. 18 U.5.C. §§ 3282, 3285 (1970). 
38. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
39. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Nilva v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094-, 1104-0'1 (7th 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 ·u.s. 911 (1971). 
40. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); In re Oliver, 833 U.S. 257 
(1948). But cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960). 
41. United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. m. 1939); Conley v. 
United States, 59 F -2d 929 (8th Cir. 1932). 
42. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d ll45, 
372 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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inal prosecutions has never been complete. Most of the cases grant-
ing rights to criminal contemnors were based either on statutory 
construction43 or on notions of due process, 44 and not on the theory 
that the rights were guaranteed by the provisions in the Bill of 
Rights specifically applicable to "crime[s]" or "criminal prosecu-
tions." In fact, as late as 1958 the Supreme Court affirmed that 
contempts are not ordinary crimes but are sui generis, and held 
that criminal contemnors are not entitled to a grand jury indictment 
or trial by jury.45 • 
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed itself on the latter 
point and held that a criminal contemnor may not be incarcerated 
for more than six months without having had or waived a jury 
trial.46 The six-month limitation was derived by analogy to the rule 
that jury trials are not constitutionally required for petty offenses.47 
While unwilling to hold that violations of section 401, which has no 
maximum penalty, are inherently nonpetty, the Court took the posi-
tion that the imposition of more than a six-month penalty demon-
strated that the particular contempt was not petty.48 Thus, in crim-
43. E.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914) (statute of limitations). 
44. E.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (right to counsel). 
45. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958). 
46. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 
380 (1966) (dictum). 
47. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). See Frankfurter &: Cor-
coran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 917 (1926). 
Congress has defined a petty offense as one for which the maximum statutory 
penalty does not exceed six months' imprisonment or a $500 fine, or both, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1(3) (1970), and the Supreme Court, without specifically adopting this definition 
as a constitutional test, has repeatedly emphasized the six-month imprisonment factor 
in recent cases dealing with the right to jury trial. See Frank v. United States, 395 
U.S. 147 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Bloom v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). But cf. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) ("we need not, however, settle in this 
case the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes"). For 
the proposition that other definitions of petty offenses would be more appropriate 
for constitutional purposes, see Kamisar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minne-
sota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. I, 68-78 
(1963); Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U. L. R.Ev. 445, 453-56 (1965). 
48. Regardless of whether one is dealing with ordinary criminal statutes that limit 
potential imprisonment to six months or with section 401 contempts, there are two 
problems created by the Supreme Court's focus on potential or actual prison sen-
tences to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial. First, if a 
defendant is convicted of several offenses, none of which alone would require trial 
by jury, is it appropriate to deny a jury trial and, at the same time, impose an 
aggregate sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment? Second, even if there is a 
statutory limit of six months' imprisonment, or if in a section 401 contempt pro-
ceeding no jail sentence is imposed, is the defendant entitled to a jury trial in the 
former case if the statute permits a substantial fine or in either case if a substantial 
fine is in fact imposed? On the aggregation problem, see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 
418 U.S. 506 (1974) (aggregate jail sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment may 
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inal contempt cases a judge must now either grant the defendant a 
jury trial or limit the sanction to six months' imprisonment.40 
Although the six-month qualification is not inconsistent with 
the jury trial mandates of article III, section 2, and the sixth amend-
ment, the Court initially grounded the right only on the Court's 
supervisory power over federal criminal procedures.00 Two years 
later the right was elevated to constitutional status.01 
At a time when the notions of inherent judicial contempt power 
and the sui generis character of contempt proceedings justified sub-
stantial procedural differences between criminal contempts and 
ordin~ry criminal offenses, it would have been futile to suggest that 
courts were not justified in exercising their inherent contempt 
power.02 This was true even a few years ago, when a recalcitrant 
grand jury witness could be convicted of contempt without a hear-
ing and when no contemnor had the constitutional right to a jury 
trial. Now, however, except for the limited category of cases within 
rule 42(a), the only significant difference between procedures for 
criminal contempts and for other criminal prosecutions is that the 
former need not be initiated by information or grand jury indict-
ment.03 It is therefore appropriate to ask to what extent the inherent 
not be imposed for multiple contempts arising during a single trial, charged by a 
single judge, and tried in a single proceeding). On the fine problem, see United 
States v. R.L. Polle &: Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971) (fine cannot exceed $500 unless 
defendant is given right to jury trial). But see Hoffman v. Local 10, Intl, Longshore-
men's &: Warehousemen's Union, 492 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. 
Muniz v. Hoffman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (No. 73-1924). See also 
In re Local 225, Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, 476 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1973). 
49. On the problems relating to prejudging the severity of the potential sentence, 
see text at notes 227-29 infra, 
50. Che.ff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966). 
51. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Because Bloom arose out of a state court 
contempt proceeding, its holding was necessarily based on the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment rather than the sixth amendment jury trial right. The 
Court in Bloom, however, clearly indicated that it would reach the same result in 
a federal contempt case. 391 U.S. at 209-10. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), suggesting that the scope of tl1e 
due process right to a jury trial is the same as the scope of the sixth amendment 
right. 
52. The absence of procedural guarantees was of much more immediate concern 
to contemnors, and anyone attempting to persuade a court to limit its power would 
undoubtedly feel more secure analogizing contempts to other crimes for the purpose 
of securing specific procedural rights than he would feel cllallenging the well-
established doctrine of inherent power. 
53. See text at notes 35-51 supra. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201·08 
(1968). 
There may be some other procedural differences, but they are relatively minor. 
See United States v. Robinson, 449 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. 
Bowles v. Seidmon, 154 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1946); Conley v. United States, 59 F.2d 
929 (8th Cir. 1932) (all indicating that notice to contemnor may be judged by stan• 
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power rationale justifies a unique initiating process for criminal 
contempts. In the absence of a sufficient justification, there is no 
basis for treating criminal contempts as other than ordinary criminal 
prosecutions-not because the right to an information or indictment 
is fundamental,64 but because, in the absence of any basis for charac-
terizing criminal contempts as sui generis, they should be viewed as 
ordinary criminal cases within the meaning of the fifth amendment's 
guarantee of a grand jury indictment as well as all other constitu-
tional55 and nonconstitutional56 provisions generally applicable to 
crimes and criminal prosecutions. 
<lards less strict than those applied to indictments). But see United States v. Schine, 
125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954); Bowles v. Bullock, 5 F.R.D. 147 (D. Del. 1945). 
See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 74 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 
suggesting that pre-trial discovery may be more limited in contempt cases than in 
ordinary criminal prosecutions. But cf. cases cited note 41 supra. 
54. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
55. E.g., the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy and the sixth 
amendment rights to counsel. See text at notes 179-84 infra (double jeopardy); text at 
note 44 supra (right to counsel). · · · 
56. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 4, 5, 7(a), 9. Rule 7 provides for initiation of ordinary 
criminal prosecutions by indictment or information, and rules 3 through 5 set forth 
the complaint, summons, warrant, and initial appearance procedures for cases in 
which the summons or warrant precedes the formal initiation of proceedings. Rule 9 
deals with the form, execution, service, and return of summonses and warrants 
issued after the return of an indictment or information. 
Several courts have equated an application for an order to show cause with an 
information. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 196 F.2d 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 829 (1952); Philippe v. Window Glass Cutters League, 99 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. 
Ark. 1951). However, since a court presumably has discretion to deny the application 
even if probable cause exists, see text at notes 62-63 infra, the application does not 
represent a formal decision to proceed with the contempt action. Rather, the appli• 
cation is more analogous to the filing of a criminal complaint, which may or may 
not result in an official decision to prosecute. The critical issue is not, however, 
the method by which the charge is made, but the method of making the formal 
decision to act on the charge. If one rejects the premise that it is appropriate to 
utilize the indictment or information process rather than rule 42 for the formal 
initiation of criminal contempt cases, there would be no reason to utilize the charg-
ing procedures in rules 3 through 5. If the premise is accepted, as this article will 
argue it should be, a major distinction that now exists between criminal contempt 
proceedings and other criminal prosecutions will be eliminated, and failure to utilize 
the same charging procedures would be inconsistent with the assimilation of criminal 
contempt with other crimes. 
The only potential problem in charging one with criminal contempt pursuant 
to rules 3 through 5 would be the question of the applicability of the rule 5(c) pre-
liminary examination provision. That provision, which grants to defendants the 
right to a preliminary examination within 20 days of an initial appearance unless 
an information or indictment is filed prior to the date set for the examination, 
explicitly exempts petty offenses, and in the context of determining whether criminal 
contemnors have a constitutional right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has taken 
the position that contempts are petty unless the sentence actually imposed exceeds 
six months' imprisonment. See text at notes 46-48 supra. This might suggest that 
criminal contemnors need not be given a preliminary examination, but that the 
failure to grant a preliminary examination in cases in which there is no indictment 
or information within 20 days of the charge will limit the contemnor's potential 
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II. ORDINARY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER 
If criminal contempts were treated for all purposes as ordinary 
criminal prosecutions, there would be three important ramifications 
for the current law of contempt: · 
First, although courts have maintained that the exercise of the 
contempt power is not dependent upon authorizing legislation,07 
the ordinary criminal prosecution of a contemnor would become 
dependent upon the existence of a criminal statute proscribing his 
conduct.58 
Second, prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of criminal con-
tempts would be transferred from the judiciary to the executive. 
Only the public prosecutor has the discretionary power to initiate 
or forgo an ordinary criminal prosecution.50 If he decides to proceed, 
the court cannot dismiss the case without the prosecutor's consent 
unless further proceedings would violate some legal mandate. 00 In 
penalty to a maximum of six months' imprisonment. This approach, however, might 
represent an unwarranted infringement on judges' sentencing discretion. The deci• 
sion to deny a jury trial and thus to limit the potential contempt sentence is made 
by a judge, but the decision to deny a preliminary examination would be made by 
a magistrate. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). Cf. text at notes 64-70 infra, discussing the 
possible effect of extending the grand jury indictment right to criminal contemnors. 
Unless one is willing to give magistrates this power, it would be desirable to amend 
rule 5(c) to clarify whether the preliminary examination right applies to all criminal 
contempts. 
The possibility of serious contempt criminal penalties in some cases should be 
a sufficient basis for extending the preliminary examination right to all criminal 
contempts, and until rule 5(c) is so amended, it would be desirable for magistrates 
to assume that criminal contempts are not petty offenses, if only to avoid potential 
litigation over the issue. Since a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination 
only if proceedings are not formally initiated prior to the date set for the hearing, 
it is not likely that extending the right to criminal contemnors will impose a 
significant burden on the judicial system, If the contumacious conduct occurs in 
the presence or is initially called to the attention of a prosecutor or grand jury, 
it is likely that an information or indictment will be returned prior to the de-
fendant's initial appearance, and thus there would be no right to a preliminary 
examination. In cases in which the appearance occurs prior to the formal initia• 
ation of proceedings, the prosecutor could follow the common practice of making 
the preliminary examination right moot by formally initiating the case prior to 
the date set for examination. See Hearings on the U.S. Commissioner System Before 
the Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess, 127 (1965). 
57. See cases cited note 2 supra. 
58. There are no federal common-law crimes. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 73 (1923). 
59. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 
(1965); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963). 
60. United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf, United States v. 
Gray, 448 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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contrast, a court may now both initiate criminal contempt pro-
ceedings on its own motion61 and refuse a request to initiate pro-
ceedings despite probable cause to believe that the contempt 
occurred.62 Furthermore, at least one case has held that a court may 
dismiss a criminal contempt proceeding after its initiation without 
the consent of the prosecutor on the basis of a discretionary deter-
mination that the dismissal is in the public interest.63 
Third, whereas the judiciary currently has complete discretion 
over the severity of a contempt sanction, 64 applying the fifth amend-
ment's grand jury indictment provision to criminal contempts 
would allow both prosecutors and grand juries to have an impact 
on courts' sentencing discretion. 65 Since the right to an indictment 
exists only for crimes for which the statutory penalty exceeds one 
year's imprisonment,66 and since the Supreme Court in the jury trial 
cases has been unwilling to view contempts as inherently nonpetty,67 
the right to a grand jury indictment presumably would not exist 
in all criminal contempt cases. However, just as the Court classified 
contempts as petty or nonpetty on the basis of the penalty actually 
imposed, 68 it presumably would also look to the actual penalty to 
determine the scope of the grand jury right. 69 Thus, a grand jury 
61. In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 
306 {3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967): In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d 915, 
917 {4th Cir. 1954), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 931 (1955); O'Malley v. United States, 128 
F.2d 676 (8th Cir.), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 
317 U.S. 412 (1942). Cf. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949) (civil 
contempt). 
62. In re Sylvester, 41 F.2d 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Ex parte McLeod, 120 F. 130 
(N.D. Ala. 1903). 
63. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965), criticized in Note, Crim-
inal Contempt: Federal Court's Power To Dismiss Proceeding Before Trial, 66 
COLUM, L. REV. 182 (1966). . 
64. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1958). Although the contemnor 
cannot receive more than a six months' sentence without "a jury trial or waiver 
thereof," Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966), it is the judge who has 
the power to grant or deny that right. See 384 U.S. at 382 {Harlan, J., dissenting). 
65. It would also result in some delay, but the delay would be no more con-
sequential in criminal contempt cases than in other criminal prosecutions. In cases 
now governed by rule 42{a), where immediate imposition of a penalty has been 
viewed as important, see text at note 5 supra, sentences cannot exceed six months' 
imprisonment. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209-10 (1968). Therefore, the indict-
ment right would not apply. · 
66. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V {"capital, or otherwise infamous crimes"). See United 
States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). 
67. See text at note 48 supra. 
68. See text at note 48 supra. 
69. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 161-62 (1968). 
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(by refusing to return an indictment) or a prosecutor (by refusing 
to seek or sign70 an indictment) could limit the potential maximum 
penalty to one year's imprisonment, and as a practical matter the 
limit could be imprisonment for six months. A judge perhaps would 
be reluctant to expend judicial resources on a jury trial if to do so 
would give him the option of adding only six months to the penalty 
that he could othenvise impose. 
The remainder of this article will examine the justifications for 
continuing to treat criminal contempts differently from other 
criminal prosecutions in terms of these three factors. 
A. Independence of the Judiciary from the Legislature 
The · judiciary, as an independent branch of the government, 
should have at least the powers necessary for it to function prop-
erly. 71 These arguably include the power to define and determine 
penalties for affronts to its authority, both in the absence of any 
legislation proscribing contumacious conduct and also, perhaps, in 
situations in which existing legislation either does not proscribe 
certain conduct deemed contumacious by the judiciary or does not 
provide a penalty adequate to vindicate the courts' authority.72 
Although the proposition that power to vindicate the courts' au-
. tliority through the imposition of criminal penalties must rest ulti-
mately in the judiciary is not beyond dispute,78 it need not be chal-
lenged here. That proposition can justify independent judicial 
action to define, initiate, and establish penalties for contempts only 
70. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 
(1965). · , 
71. Courts have claimed inherent power to regulate a number of activities that 
are necessary for or related to the proper functioning of the judiciary, See, e.g., 
People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) (inherent 
power to order payment from public funds of indigent defendant's appointed coun-
sel): State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961) (inherent 
.power to regulate practice of law). See also Dowling, The Inherent Power of the 
]udidary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 
12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926): Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal 
Courts, 53 GEO, L.J. 1050 (1965). 
72. See, e.g., Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971) (contempt statute limiting 
criminal penalty for refusal to testify to 30 dollars and 24 hours' imprisonment is 
an unconstitutional legislative infringement on courts' contempt power). 
73. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 284-308. Although Goldfarb does not deal 
specifically with the issue of the source of the power, most of his recommendations 
contemplate legislative action. He does suggest that courts should have a limited 
inherent right to quell disruptions tlu'.ough use of the contempt power. Id, at 299-
300, 305-06. Even in these types of cases, however, the theoretical possibility that 
Congress may refuse to enact appropriate legislation arguably does not outweigh 
the danger that courts may not be sufficiently restrained in exercising a claimed 
inherent. contempt power. See id. at 5-9. See also Green v. United States, 856 U.S. 
165, 193-219 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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when the legislative provisions are inadequate, and that circum-
stance does not exist in the federal system. The Supreme Court ·has 
recognized that Congress can regulate the contempt power, and the· 
Court has approved the present congressional limitations oh · the 
exercise of the power: The proscription in section 401 against im-
posing both a fine and a prison sentence is binding on the courts,74 
and courts may not exercise their inherent power under rule 42 to 
punish contumacious conduct that does not fall within the scope· of 
section 401.75 Contempts that do fall within that section, however, 
also may be initiated by indictment.76 Thus, judicial fear of depen-
dence upon the legislature cannot justify treating section 401 con-
tempts differently from other criminal prosecutions.77 
The extent to which Congress could further limit the contempt 
power is admittedly uncertain. On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court has never struck down any congressional regulation of the 
contempt power, and, in fact, has suggested that Congress may have 
considerable latitude in regulating the contempt power of the 
circuit and district courts: "These courts were created by act of 
Congress. Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling 
them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their 
jurisdiction. The act of 1831 [now section 401] is, therefore, to them 
the law specifying the cases in which summary punishment for 
contempts may be infl.icted."78 On the other hand, the Court affirmed 
74. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943). Cf. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 
505, 512 (1873). 
75. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-53 (1941). 
76. See cases cited note 28 supra. 
77. Several methods exist for implementing the goal of treating criminal contempts 
as ordinary criminal prosecutions. For example, instead of abandoning reliance on the 
inherent contempt power theory and holding that contempts should be viewed as ordi-
nary crimes, the judiciary (retaining its claim to inherent contempt power) could exer-
cise its discretion to refuse to initiate proceedings pursuant to rule 42 on the theory 
that initiation by indictment is an adequate alternative. See text at notes 200-04 infra •. 
Although existing legislation clearly permits this alternative, it is unclear whether 
the legislation is sufficient· to allow courts entirely to· forgo reliance on the notion 
of inherent contempt power. See text at notes 205-06 infra, suggesting that section 
401 may be only a statement of·the courts' contempt power and that the indictment 
precedents merely represent a judicial acquiescence in prosecutors' and grand juries' 
requests for contempt proceedings. But see note 206 infra. 
78. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873). 
Since the Supreme Court, unlike other federal courts, derives its power from the 
Constitution rather than from Congress, see U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1, Congress may 
not be able to regulate the Court's contempt power at all, or at least not to the same 
extent that it can regulate the contempt power of lower federal courts. See Michael-
son v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 
505, 510 (1873) (by implication); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8. 
This suggested distinction between constitutionally created and legislatively created 
courts has little practical bearing on the legislative power to regulate contempts in 
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in the same case that "the power to punish for contempts is inherent 
in all courts. "79 Furthermore, the existing restrictions on the courts' 
exercise of the contempt power are not substantial: Section 401 
contains an extremely broad substantive definition of contempt80 
and prescribes no maximum penalty. 
If the Court continues to maintain that the need to impose 
immediate penalties for contempts now punishable pursuant to rule 
42(a) outweighs granting even the minimal due process protections 
of prior notice and hearing,81 it is doubtful that the Court would 
condone a congressional attempt to eliminate this summary power. 
Similarly, the Court may be reluctant to accept amendments to 
section 401 that would leave some types of contumacious behavior 
unpunishable.82 Hopefully, however, the Court would not object to 
the imposition of reasonable maximum penalties for various types 
of contumacious conduct now governed by section 401,88 or to 
limitations on the possible use of rule 42(b) through the enactment 
of legislation that restricts the substantive scope of section 401 but 
allows conduct now covered by that section to be treated as an ordi-
nary criminal offense.84 The 1831 contempt legislation provides a 
the federal system. The Supreme Court has exercised its contempt power only once, 
See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). The distinction, however, has im• 
portant implications for the power of state legislatures to regulate the contempt 
power of state trial courts, many of which are constitutionally created, See Kuhns, 
Revising a State Judicial Article: Issues for the North Dakota Constitutional Con-
vention, 48 N.D. L. R.Ev. 219, 225-26 (1972), Since the reasons for deciding whether 
to give a state court constitutional status are generally unrelated to the contempt 
regulation question, id. at 225-26, 236, the mere fact that a court was established 
by the state constitution rather than by the legislature does not necessarily justify 
limiting the extent to which its contempt power may be regulated. 
79. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). 
80, Falco, Federal Criminal Contempts and the Proposed New Federal Criminal 
Code, 11 AM. CRIM. L, R.Ev. 429, 432-33 (1973). 
81, See note 34 supra. 
82, Some types of conduct presently within section 401 arc punishable under 
other criminal statutes. For example, attempting to influence or bribe a juror is both 
a specific criminal offense and a section 401 contempt. Compare Kong v. United 
States, 216 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1954) (criminal prosecution for violation of 18 U,S.C, 
§ 1503), with Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 223 (D.C, Cir, 1946), cert, denied, 
331 U.S. 840 (1947) (contempt prosecution under 28 U.S.C, § 385 (1940), as amended, 
28 u.s.c. § 401 (1970)). 
83. See NATIONAL COMMN. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAws, PROPOSED NEW 
FEDERAL CRIJIIINAL CODE § 1341 (1971) [hereinafter PROP, FED, CRIM, CODE], 
84, It is important to distinguish between these two types of legislation, On the 
one hand, the mere imposition of maximum penalties for violations of section 401 
or the enactment of several statutes patterned after section 401 that define the 
courts' contempt power and prescribe various penalties for different types of conduct 
would appear not to affect the courts' initiating discretion or the availability of rule 
42. The maximum penalty provisions, however, presumably would- determine whether 
the contemnor would be entitled to a jury trial, See note 47 supra. On the other 
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precedent for the latter type of regulation,85 and 18 U.S.C. § 402 
provides a limited precedent for legislative imposition of maximum 
contempt penalties.86 Neither type of legislation would appear to 
infringe upon the judiciary's interest in protecting its capacity to 
hand, eliminating from the scope of section 401 conduct proscribed by other existing 
or concurrently enacted statutes that do not explicitly refer to the courts' contempt 
power would appear to represent a congressional judgment to limit the substantive 
scope of that power. Proceedings for violations of these statutes presumably could 
be initiated only by information or indictment, and the penalty provision of any 
such statute would determine not only whether the defendant is entitled to a jury 
trial, but also whether he is entitled to a grand jury indictment. 
The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code recommends an unusual and somewhat 
puzzling combination of these two types of regulation. See PROP, FED. CRIM. CODE, 
supra note 83, §§ 1341-49. Section 1341, the basic criminal contempt statute, retains 
the substantive definition of the court's contempt power currently contained in sec-
tion 401, but imposes a six-month maximum prison sentence. Presumably, proceed-
ings for violations of this section could be initiated pursuant to rule 42. See WORKING 
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 601-03. The next four sections define as specific criminal 
offenses and provide slightly different ma.ximum penalties for conduct that, to a 
substantial extent, also comes under section 1341: failure to appear (§ 1342); refusal 
to testify (§ 1343); hindering proceedings by disruptive conduct (§ 1344); and dis-
obedience of a judicial order (§ 1345). Proceedings for violations of these sections 
apparently could be initiated only by information or indictment. See PROP. FED. 
CRThl. CODE, supra, § 1349; comments to id. §§ 1342-49. These provisions, however, 
apparently are not intended to limit the substantive scope of section 1341, see WORK-
ING PAPERS, supra, at 610-11, 614-15, 621, 624, 625-26, and with limited exceptions, 
prosecutions for violations of these sections could not be initiated without judicial 
certification that the case is an appropriate one to consider for prosecution. PROP. 
FED. CRIM. CODE, supra, § 1349; WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 625-26. Furthermore, if 
such a certification is accompanied by a recommendation for prosecution, section 
1349 requires the public prosecutor to proceed with the case. The stated reason 
for the certification requirement is to allow the judiciary to retain initiating discre-
tion over contempts. WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 625-26. 
Of the number of questions raised by these proposed statutes, see Falco, supra 
note 80; cf. note 213 infra, one is of particular concern for the purposes of this 
article: Is tl1e requirement of prior judicial certification for the initiation of pro-
ceedings under sections 1342-45 an implicit rejection of the precedent for allowing 
initiation of criminal contempt proceedings by indictment without prior judicial 
approval? See note 28 supra and accompanying text. But cf. text at notes 205-06 infra. 
Although neither the Proposed Code nor the Working Papers specifically addresses 
this question, an affirmative an5'ver would be consistent with the Code's general 
sclleme of maintaining judicial control over the initiating decision. If the an5'ver 
is affirmative, and if the proposed contempt provisions are adopted in their present 
form, they will have the undesirable consequence of perpetuating a basic and largely 
unnecessary distinction between criminal contempts and other crimes. 
85. See text at notes 15-17 supra. 
86. See note 25 supra. In a brief comment affirming that Congress can regulate 
the contempt power, the Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.1 
(1968), stated that Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 
&: Omaha Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924), had upheld the constitutionality of both the jury 
trial and maxinmm penalty provisions of section 402. Michaelson, however, dealt solely 
with the jury trial provision, and although there is no reason to believe that the 
Court would not also have upheld the penalty provision, it is important_ to note that 
Michaelson stressed that section 402 covered only limited types of contempts, thereby 
implying that a similar jury trial-and perhaps maximum penalty-provision applicable 
to all contempts might not be upheld. 266 U.S. at 66-67. But cf. text at note 78 supra. 
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function as an independent branch of the government, 87 and as the 
following analysis will suggest, such legislative regulation would be 
beneficial. 88 
There is no certainty that Congress would limit itself to these 
types of regulation or that the judiciary would reaffirm the view 
that Congress may impose substantial limits on the contempt power. 
However, the precedent for judicial deference to congressional 
action, and the fact that Congress has not in the past attempted 
unreasonably to restrict the contempt power, suggest that the judi-
ciary probably will not be forced to confront Congress over the 
question whether the inherent power rationale or the sui generis 
character of the contempt offense limits Congress' power to legislate 
in this area. In any event, the fact remains that, at least for the 
present, the need for judicial independence from the legislature is 
not a valid basis for refusing to treat criminal contempts as ordi-
nary criminal prosecutions. 
B. Independence of the Judiciary from the Executive: Initiation 
Since treating contempts as ordinary criminal prosecutions would 
transfer prosecutorial discretion in criminal contempt cases from 
the judiciary to the executive,89 it is important to consider whether 
the judiciary has an interest that justifies reserving to itself the 
power to decide whether to initiate criminal contempt proceedings. 
Four factors, one or more of which may exist in any contempt 
situation, suggest that the judiciary may have such an interest: (1) an 
asserted need for immediate action pursuant to rule 42(a) when the 
conduct occurs in the immediate view of the court; (2) the notion 
that the judiciary is the party injured by the conduct; (3) the theory 
that contumacious conduct that violates a court order is qualitatively 
different from violations of criminal statutes; and (4) the fear that 
the public prosecutor will not be sufficiently responsive to contempts 
87. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. 
88. See text at notes 205-13, 249-56 infra. 
89. In light of recent criminal and political activities commonly referred to as 
the Watergate scandal, see C. BERNSI"EIN &: B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S l\fEN 
(1974), it may appear unreasonable to suggest that any additional powers should 
be given to the executive branch. The following analysis, which argues that prose-
cutorial discretion over criminal contempts should rest with the executive rather 
than the judiciary, is based solely on the premise that criminal contempts should 
be treated as are all other criminal prosecutions. The analysis does not address itself 
to and does not intend to imply any conclusions about the extent to or manner in 
which prosecutorial discretion in general should be regulated or insulated from 
executive political control. See also note 100 infra. 
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of the courts' authority. The analysis here will be limited to a con-
sideration of the last three factors.90 
I. Injury to the Judiciary 
The fact that the purpose of the criminal contempt sanction is to 
vindicate the courts' authority implies that injury to judicial au-
thority is a necessary condition for a court's initiation of contempt 
proceedings. In contempt cases, however, courts are often injured 
parties only in a secondary sense. For example, when an individual 
disobeys a court order to testify, the most immediate injury is to the 
party that would have benefited from the testimony. If the fact of 
injury is a relevant criterion for allocating discretion to initiate 
criminal contempts, the court's interest arguably is not as great as 
the interest of the person for whose benefit the order was granted. 
In some situations (e.g., when court proceedings are physically 
disrupted or, perhaps, when an individual refuses to appear before 
a court or grand jury) the court itself may appropriately be viewed 
as the primary injured party. Yet, even in these situations, the fact 
of injury, although it may be a necessary condition for invocation 
of the contempt power, is not a sufficient basis for giving the judi-
ciary power to decide whether to initiate criminal contempt pro-
ceedings: The right to invoke proceedings that may lead to a 
punitive sanction is one appropriately exercised in the public in-
terest and not for personal vindication.91 The only federal precedent 
90. It would be possible to require that contempts now punishable without prior 
notice or hearing pursuant to rule 42(a) also be initiated by the executive. How-
ever, even if prosecutors were generally responsive to requests from judges for the 
initiation of contempt proceedings in these cases, such a requirement could entail 
an arguably unwarranted delay. It is true that contemnors subject to punishment 
without a hearing presumably would not be entitled to a grand jury indictment, see 
note 65 supra, and the preparation and filing of an information often could be 
completed in a few minutes. Still, if the need for immediate action is sufficient to 
justify denying a hearing, the risk of delay might override considerations favoring 
executive initiation. 
An additional argument for not requiring executive initiation of such contempts 
concerns the danger of establishing a precedent denying a hearing to a defendant 
in a case that appears, at least at the outset, to be an ordinary criminal prosecution. 
That precedent might be used in other contexts to suspend or modify defendants' 
rights on the basis of an asserted need for immediate punishment, the fact that 
the judge personally observed the criminal conduct, or some similar factor. To avoid 
any potential erosion of procedural rights in other criminal prosecutions, it would 
be preferable either to eliminate completely the possibility of summarily imposing 
a contempt penalty or to maintain the unique rule 42(a) procedure. 
91. See generally Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &: Enginemen v. United 
States, 411 F.2d 312, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171, 
182-83, 190-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 
F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To 
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suggesting a contrary view is the inherent power claimed by Con-
gress to punish contempts of its authority.92 The validity of the 
congressional claim to this power, however, is not beyond dispute.93 
If the power does exist, it arguably is only a coercive power anal-
ogous to the judiciary's coercive civil contempt power.04 Moreover, 
since the rationale for exercising inherent contempt power is neces-
sity, any support that the congressional precedent may appear to 
give to the claim that injured parties should be able to initiate 
contempt proceedings is undermined by the fact that Congress in 
recent years has not attempted to exercise the power.ml Rather, 
contempts of Congress are dealt with as ordinary criminal 
prosecutions.96 
Even if one were to conclude that all contempts injure the judi-
ciary and that injured parties generally should be able to initiate 
criminal proceedings, this should not be a sufficient basis for allow-
ing th~ judiciary to initiate criminal contempt proceedings. The 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the ability of the 
judiciary to punish an affront to its authority poses a danger that the 
judgment may be unduly vindictive or based on a distorted view of 
the gravity of the offense: Rule 42(b) provides that "[i]f the con-
tempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that 
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing .... "07 
Rule 42(b), however, does not offer protection against a judge's 
possible institutional bias, and to the extent that institutional injury 
is the rationale for treating contempts uniquely, the potential for 
institutional bias may be increased. 
Whether institutional biases would be mitigated merely by plac-
ing the initiating function with the executive is admittedly open to. 
CHARGE A SUSPECT ·wrrH A Cru11m 9-10 (1969); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction 
and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW &: CONTEllfi'. PROB, 64 (1948}, But cf. Comment, 
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 
YALE L.J. 209 (1955). 
92. See generally C. BECK, CoNTEJ\fPT OF CONGRESS (1959); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 
2, at 40-43. 
93. The Supreme Court has approved of the congressional exercise of inherent 
contempt power. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). But see C. BECK, 
supra note 92, at 3-5; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 25-30, 
94. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821). See also Quinn 
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 169 (1955). On the distinction between criminal and 
civil contempt, see text at notes 149-61 infra. 
95. See R, GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 43, 
96. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), See 
also notes 212-13 infra and accompanying text, discussing the statutory obligation of 
the prosecutor to present contempts of Congress to a grand jury._ 
97. Cf. cases cited note 100 infra. 
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question. The prosecutor's close professional contact with the courts 
may make him reluctant to refuse a judge's request that he initiate a 
contempt action.98 Still, the requirement of an independent, execu-
tive initiating decision would provide at least a theoretical check 
against possible bias, and, more importantly, the absence of any such 
check on judicial power, both to initiate proceedings against and 
to convict individuals who affront judicial authority, gives the 
exercise of contempt power the appearance of being potentially 
arbitrary and unfair. Unless there are other overriding considera-
tions,99 the initiating power over criminal contempts should be 
removed from the judiciary, if only to ensure that "justice ... satisfy 
the appearance of fairness."100 • 
98. Alfred A. Arraj, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado, has established a policy of having criminal contempts initiated 
by indictment because the order to shqw cause may not inform the defendant of 
the charge against him with the same degree of specificity as would an indictment. 
Cf. note 53 supra. Although only a few criminal contempt cases have arisen since 
the policy was instituted, federal prosecutors have not refused to seek an indictment 
in any case called to their attention by the court, and Judge Arraj expressed the 
view that such a refusal would be highly unlikely in light of the close working 
relationship between the court and the prosecutors. Interview with Judge Arraj, 
November 21, 1973, Denver, Colo. Federal prosecutors in Denver confirmed this view, 
and prosecutors in otl_ler cities agreed that the process of initiating criminal con• 
tempts by indictment would not be likely to create conflicts betl\'een the court and 
the prosecutor's office. See note 134 infra. 
99. See note 90 supra. 
100. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418 
U.S. 488, 501 (1974); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 578 (1964); Green v. United States, 
356 U.S. 165, 198-99 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); 
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 254-57. 
In some situations there is arguably an equal or greater potential for unfairness 
if the public prosecutor is vested with initiating discretion over criminal contempts. 
For example, when a prosecutor decides to initiate a contempt prosecution against 
a recalcitrant grand jury witness, the prosecutor, because of his direct interest in the 
grand jury proceedings, may be acting, or may appear to be acting, on purely vin-
dictive motives. This possibility, however, should not be regarded as a sufficient basis 
for retaining initiating discretion over criminal contempts with the judiciary for at 
least three reasons. First, in terms of the appearance of fairness, retaining initiating 
discretion with the judiciary does not solve the problem but only maintains the 
appearance of judicial unfairness. Second, to the extent that one is concerned with 
actual unfairness or abuse of discretion by the prosecutor, retaining initiating dis-
cretion with the judiciary is not likely to be an effective remedy. See text at notes 
144-48 infra. Third, the potential for prosecutorial unfairness or the appearance of 
unfairness may exist not only in some contempt cases but in any cases in which the 
prosecutor has or appears to have a personal or institutional interest in the pro-
ceedings. For example, the danger of unfairness on the part of $e prosecutor is no 
greater in the case of a grand jury witness who refuses to testify than in the case 
of a grand jury witness who appears to commit perjury or in any case in which a 
member of the prosecutor's office is the victim of some criminal act. 
The appropriate resolution of this problem is not to deprive the public prose-
cutor of initiating discretion over criminal contempts, but to develop standards and 
methods for regulating the prosecutor's discretionary power in all cases. See gener-
ally K. DAVIS, D1s~RETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); F. MILLER, supra note 91. The general 
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2. The Unique Nature of a Court Order 
Many criminal contempt cases result from the contemnor's 
refusal to obey a court order,101 and in one important respect the 
violation of a court order generally is treated differently from the 
violation of a criminal statute: If the statute is invalid, the invalidity 
will require the defendant's acquittal.102 If a court order is invalid, 
its violation may nonetheless be treated as contempt,103 except where 
the court lacks jurisdiction to issue the order104 or, perhaps, where 
the defendant has no opportunity to contest the validity of the 
order.105 Thus, in Walker v. City of Birmingham,100 the Supreme 
Court upheld the criminal contempt convictions of civil rights 
marchers who violated an injunction against demonstrating even 
though the language of the injunction-the validity of which was 
deemed collateral to the contempt proceeding and therefore not 
necessary to determine107-"might be subject to substantial consti-
tutional question."108 Had the defendants been convicted of violat-
problem of controlling prosecutorial discretion is beyond the scope of this article, 
Professor Davis, however, suggests the possible desirability of judicial review of deci-
sions not to prosecute, K. DAVIS, supra, at 224·25, and the analysis here has argued 
that the judiciary is a particularly inappropriate body to exercise discretionary power 
to decide whether criminal contempt proceedings should be initiated. If federal 
courts develop the doctrine that refusals to prosecute are subject to judicial review, 
the question arises as to whether that doctrine should apply to criminal contempts 
as well as to other crimes. The answer should probably be affirmative-at least if the 
scope of judicial review is limited. Since the focus of inquiry would be on abuse 
of discretion rather than on injury to the judiciary, the potential for judicial bias 
or the appearance of unfairness probably would be minimal. 
101. E.g., Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (enforcement of administra, 
tive agency's subpoena); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (refusal to testify 
before grand jury); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (labor dispute). 
102. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Lovell v, 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), 
Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 
345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
103. If the court has jurisdiction to issue the order, the validity of the order 
cannot be collaterally attacked in a criminal contempt proceeding. Maness v. Meyers, 
43 U.S.L.W. 4143, 4146-47 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); 
Western Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1943), See Cox, The 
Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. CHI, L. R.Ev. 86 (1948); Rodgers, The Elusive 
Search for the Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal Contempt Pro• 
ceedings, 49 B.U. L. R.Ev. 251 (1969); Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HAnv, 
L. R.Ev. 626 (1970). 
104. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887): Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885). See 
articles cited note 103 supra; Maness v. Meyers, 43 U.S.L.W. 4143 (U.S. Jan. 15, 
1975). 
105. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318-19; Blasi, Prior Re-
straints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1481, 1555-72 (1970). 
106. 388 U.S. 307 (1967), 
107. 388 U.S. at 313-14, 320. Cf. note 103 supra, 
108. 388 U.S. at 317, Justices Douglas, Warren, Brennan, and Fortas thought the 
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ing the parade ordinance on which the injunction was based, the 
invalidity of the ordinance would have required reversal.109 How-
ever, since the trial court "[w]ithout question" had jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction,11° the contempt convictions were affirmed. The 
Court suggested that it might have reached the opposite conclusion 
only if the contemnors had not had an adequate opportunity to seek 
judicial review of the order prior to its violation.111 
Although this distinction between the consequences of violating 
invalid statutes and violating invalid court orders bears no necessary 
relationship to the process by which proceedings are initiated for 
either type of violation, it does suggest that the duty to obey court 
orders is more pervasive than the duty to obey statutes,112 and to the 
injunction was clearly unconstitutional. 388 U.S. at 334 (dissenting opinion). See also 
note 109 infra. 
109. Two years after its decision in Walker, the Court unanimously reversed the 
convictions of defendants who had been prosecuted for violating the Birmingham 
parade ordinance. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
BO. 388 U.S. at 315. 
lll. 388 U.S. at 318-19. 
ll2. See Bickel, Civil Disobedience and the Duty To Obey, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 199 
(1973). 
Professor Bickel draws a basic distinction between the duty to obey legislative 
commands and the duty to obey adjudicatory commands. Violations of legislative 
mandates, he contends, may sometimes be justified as legitimate acts of "law forma-
tion." Id. at 200. This would be the case, for example, if one violated a statute he 
thought was unconstitutional. Our legal system legitimizes this type of law violation 
by not punishing the violator if his theory of the law ultimately prevails. Id. at 
200-01, 203. In contrast, Professor Bickel asserts that there is no justification for 
disobeying an adjudicatory mandate. For example, with regard to the defendants in 
Walker, he says: 
If one is not under a moral obligation to obey at this point [after the issuance 
of the injunction], then the very possibility of any legal order at all •.• is 
placed in the gravest doubt. • • • Lack of assent to, and widespread disobedience 
of, a general law • • • may be a legitimate way of questioning it • • • • But 
disobedience of a court's judgment does not question the judgment, for it is, in 
theory and in practice, irreversible. Here disobedience questions the very legal 
order itself, which must in the end rest on something more than its power to 
coerce. 
Id. at 212-13. 
Although Professor Bickel relies heavily on the normative legal distinction between 
violations of invalid statutes and violations of invalid court orders, he does not rely 
on it exclusively to define the scope of what he considers legitimate law violation. 
For example, whereas an invalid criminal statute may be violated with impunity 
regardless of the violator's motives, Professor Bickel contends that such law violation 
is appropriate only if the violator acts "on grounds of moral or political principle,'' 
id. at 208, and he states that there "must, overall, be an imbalance on the side of 
obedience.'' Id. at 214. Professor Bickel, however, is less clear in distinguishing be-
t\veen the moral duty and the legal duty to obey court orders. For example, after 
citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922), for the proposition that even 
an invalid court order must be obeyed, he states that "[o]nly when the court's claim 
to authority is transparently frivolous, 'when a court is so obviously travelling outside 
its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities'; only then, in the 
case of an 'indisputable want of authority on the part of a court,' may an order 
be disobeyed.'' Id. at 212, quoting United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 309-10 (Frank· 
506 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:484 
extent that such a duty exists, there may be a symbolic value in utiliz-
ing different initiating procedures for the two types of violations. The 
analysis here will suggest that there may be no unique legal or 
moral duty to obey court orders, and that, even if such a duty exists, 
it should have no bearing on how contempt proceedings are ini-
tiated. 
In Walker the Court implied that a contempt sanction for 
violating an invalid injunction may be justified by the fact that the 
mandate was issued by a court: "[I]n the fair administration of 
justice no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his 
station, however righteous his motives . . . . [R]espect for judicial 
process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which 
alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom.''113 It is 
not clear, however, that the 
O 
duty to obey invalid mandates rests 
furter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Cf. Cox, supra note 103, at 109. To the 
extent that this statement is meant to be descriptive, it is inaccurate in two respects. 
First, it does not take account of the suggestion in Walker that lack of opportunity 
to challenge a court order may be a defense in a contempt proceeding to punish the 
violation, and, second, transparent frivolity has not been the exclusive test for deter• 
mining whether a court has jurisdiction to issue the order. See cases cited note 118 
infra; Cox, supra note 103, at 108. To the extent that Professor Bickel's statement 
is intended as one of moral principle, it leaves unanswered the question why such 
a duty should exist if there is no opportunity to challenge the validity of the order, 
see note 114 infra, or if there are reasonable grounds for challenging the court's 
jurisdiction. See text at notes 117-23 infra. 
Since it is not clear whether Professor Bickel intended his statement to be one 
of moral principle, and since even the recognition of a greater moral or legal duty 
to obey court orders would not justify a unique initiating procedure for criminal 
contempts, see text at and following notes 125-26 infra, it is not necessary to dwell 
further on the nature and scope of the moral duty to obey court orders. The fol-
lowing analysis, however, will suggest that the legal duty to obey, as evidenced by 
the legal consequences of violating an invalid mandate, may not depend upon whether 
the mandate is legislative or adjudicatory, See notes 114-15 infra and accompanying 
text. If there is no unique legal duty to obey invalid court orders, the bases upon 
which Professor Bickel relies to support his distinction between the duty to obey 
adjudicatory mandates and the duty to obey legislative mandates would appear to be 
substantially undermined. Thus, in fairness to Professor Bickel, it is important to point 
out two factors that suggest that his views regarding the duty to obey are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the views expressed in this article. First, although he makes no explicit 
reference to the lack of opportunity for review dictum in Walker, he describes court or-
ders as "final judicial decree[s] ••• issued against named individuals, following a trial to 
which they were parties," Bickel, supra, at 211 (emphasis added). Arguably, the italicized 
words define at least an implicit limitation on the scope of the duty to obey judicial or• 
ders. Second, although Professor Bickel's use of the term "law formation" to describe 
legitimate law violation and his reservation of that term for violations of nonad• 
judicatory mandates perhaps implies an exaggerated notion of the duty to obey court 
orders, the primary thesis of his article is not that all court orders must be obeyed, 
but that a commitment to the rule of law does not entail a moral duty to obey all 
laws. Id. at 211, 214. The establishment of this thesis does not require a detailed 
analysis of the scope of the duty to obey all adjudicatory mandates, and presumably 
Professor Bickel did not intend his observations to pass for such an analysis, 
113. 388 U.S. at 320-21 (footnote omitted), But cf, In re Berry, 68 Ca]. 2d 137, 
436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968). 
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solely, or even primarily, on whether they are of judicial ongm. 
Rather, the critical issue may be whether there is an adequate oppor-
tunity for judicial review of the mandate prior to its violation. As 
noted previously, the Walker Court suggested that it might have 
reached a different result if the contemnors had not had an. ade-
quate opportunity to challenge the validity of the injunction,114 and 
it is arguable that the adequacy of pre-violation judicial review is-
114. See text at note 111 supra. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), 
reversing a contempt conviction on first amendment grounds where the defendant 
had made a speech in violation of an invalid restraining order served only hours 
before the speech was to be delivered. The injunction in Thomas had been issued 
to enforce a state statute requiring labor organizers to obtain a permit prior to 
soliciting membership, and in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the contempt 
conviction, the state supreme court considered and rejected the merits of Thomas' 
constitutional claim, thereby implicitly disregarding any legal distinction between a 
violation of the statute and a violation of the injunction. Ex parte Thomas, 141 
Tex. 591, 174 S.W.2d 958 (1943). The United States Supreme Court, recognizing that 
the case did not raise an issue of the state court's jurisdiction to issue an invalid 
order, treated the case as if the defendant had been prosecuted for violating the 
registration statute. 323 U.S. at 524-25 &: n.7. Without relying specifically on the time 
factor, the Court reversed the conviction because the injunction represented an 
unconstitutional application of the statute. Thus, it is arguable that Thomas stands 
for the proposition that one may violate an unconstitutionally applied statute re-
gardless of the availability of judicial remedies to test the validity of the application. 
Cf. Blasi, supra note 105, at 1562. Two factors, however, suggest that this is not an 
appropriate reading of Thomas. First, Justice Rutledge, the author of the plurality 
opinion, indicated in a later case that Thomas turned in large part on the lack of 
opportunity for judicial review. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 351-52 (1947) 
(dissenting opinion). Second, in Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), the 
Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who violated a valid registration ordi-
nance that had been unconstitutionally applied to him. 
In Poulos the defendant had been arbitrarily denied a permit to hold a religious 
meeting, and although there were six weeks between the initial denial and the date 
scheduled for the meeting, the defendant decided to proceed with the meeting 
rather than pursue available remedies to challenge the denial. The majority mis-
takenly distinguished Thomas as a case holding the statutory scheme invalid on its 
face rather than as applied, see Blasi, supra, at 1561-62, and there is no explicit 
reliance on the fact that there were six weeks in which the defendant could have 
sought judicial review of the permit denial. Nonetheless, the Court's justification for 
the decision, which is strikingly similar to its justification for Walker, see text at 
note 11~ supra, suggests that opportunity for judicial review is a critical factor in 
determining whether it is appropriate to resort to self-help in the face of an un-
constitutionally applied mandate, whether or not the mandate is judicial: "[T)he 
expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens must pay for life in an 
orderly society where the Rights of the First Amendment have a real and abid-
ing meaning." 345 U.S. at 409. Cf. Blasi, supra, at 1568-72; Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908). 
For other cases suggesting that at least a limited opportunity for judicial review 
may be a prerequisite to punishment for contempt in many circumstances, see 
Carroll v. President &: Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); In re Green, 
369 U.S. 689 (1962), discussed in Walker, 388 U.S. at 315 n.6 (majority opinion), 
332-33 n.9 (Warren, C.J., dissenting), and in 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 517, 522 (1968); Okla-
homa Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Alexander v. United States, 201 
U.S. 117, 121 (1906); United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971); Carlson 
v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1954). See also 3 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE &: PROCEDURE § 702, at 151-52 (1969, Supp. 1974). 
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or at least should be-determinative of whether an invalid statute 
may be violated ·with impunity.115 
The extent to which availability of prior judicial review explains 
the consequences that :flow from violating an invalid mandate is 
admittedly uncertain. The Supreme Court has never upheld a con-
viction based on a void statute, nor has it clarified its dictum in 
Walker.116 However, even if one concedes that there is or should be 
a unique duty to obey court orders, it is important to note that the 
legal duty to obey an invalid judicial mandate exists only if the 
court has jurisdiction to issue the order.117 Courts consistently have 
held that a judge lacks jurisdiction to order testimony that would 
violate a witness' privilege against self-incrimination,118 and in the 
115. The availability of pre-violation review of a statute may often be inadequate 
regardless of the scope of review, merely because it is unreasonable to expect a 
potential criminal defendant to utilize the revie-1v procedures, See Note, Declaratory 
Relief in the Criminal LaVJ, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1490, 1502-03 (1967). Where, however, 
the state has a legitimate interest in regulating conduct through, for example, a statu-
tory licensing or permit scheme, the necessity for utilizing those procedures arguably 
should not depend upon whether the statutory scheme is void on its face, but upon the 
adverse effect that compliance would entail. Cf. note 116 infra. While invalidity of the 
statutory scheme should be considered in deciding whether the opportunity for review 
was adequate, it should not necessarily be conclusive. See Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), referred to in note 109 supra, where Justice Harlan 
based his concurring opinion specifically on the inadequacy of the opportunity for 
review and not on the facial invalidity of the statute. 394 U.S. at 159-64. See also 
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV, L. REv. 518, 548-51 (1970). 
116. In some instances it might be appropriate to punish an individual for vio-
lating an order even if there is no opportunity for judicial review. For example, 
violating a particular court order might substantially alter the position of the person 
for whose benefit it was issued, whereas obeying the injunction, even if invalid or 
beyond the court's jurisdiction, would not have a substantial adverse effect on the 
party enjoined. See, e.g., Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of Carpenters 8: Joiners, 
308 F. Supp. 172 (1969), affd., 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 
(1971). Cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 311 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Alternatively, there may be situations in which the rights infringed upon by 
the issuance of an invalid order are so important that one should be allowed to 
resort to self-help regardless of the opportunity for judicial review. See Maness v. 
Meyers, 43 U.S.L.W. 4143, 4147 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975). But cf. 43 U.S.L.W at 4151 
(White, J., concurring); Blasi, supra note 105, at 1563. 
If opportunity for judicial review is a prerequisite to the punishment of those who 
violate invalid court orders, the question remains as to how extensive the opportunity 
should be. For the proposition that the adequacy of the scope of revie-1v should 
turn in part on the nature of the rights infringed upon by the invalid order, see 
Blasi, supra, at 1559-72. 
117. See cases cited note 104 supra. 
118. The thought of punishing a witness for refusing to obey an order that vio-
lates the privilege against self-incrimination is apparently so abhorrent to courts 
that they rarely bother to mention the question of jurisdiction and instead proceed 
immediately to the merits of the fifth amendment claim. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). But see 
Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 226 (1st Cir, 1954) (criminal contempt) (court 
order violative of witness' fifth amendment right is not a "lawful order" within the 
meaning of section 401(3)); Foot v. Buchanan, 113 F. 156, 158 (C.C.N.D. Miss. 1902) 
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numerous recalcitrant witness contempt cases involving valid fifth 
amendment claims,119 the practical effect has been to treat violations 
of orders to testify no differently than violations of statutes.120 In 
addition, although contemnors' jurisdictional challenges have seldom 
prevailed in non-witness cases,121 courts have not been consistent in 
distinguishing between orders that are merely invalid and orders 
that are beyond a court's jurisdiction.122 In situations in which this 
inconsistency raises a colorable claim of lack of jurisdiction-re-
gardless of the legal consequences of violating the order-there 
would appear at least to be no unique moral obligation to obey the 
mandate merely because it is judicial. If one is justified in violating 
a statute to obtain judicial review of its constitutionality,123 he 
should be equally justified in violating a court order to obtain 
review of the question of jurisdiction. 
Despite present uncertainties over the nature of the duty to obey 
invalid judicial mandates, courts may begin to focus more clearly 
on the concept of jurisdiction and the relevance of an opportunity 
for pre-violation judicial review. If, as a result, it becomes clear that 
violations of invalid court orders-but not invalid statutes-are 
generally punishable, there is arguably a symbolic value in having a 
unique initiating procedure for ~ontempts based on violations of 
court orders. Recognition of the principle that it is not appropriate 
to disobey court orders is particularly important in a society that 
openly condones violations of invalid legislative mandates. Espe-
cially if one perceives that those who may be prone to use self-help 
to advance their goals do not understand or appreciate this principle, 
a separate initiating process for criminal contempts may seem to be 
an appropriate, although admittedly somewhat obscure, device to 
(civil contempt) ("Any exercise of jurisdiction or power violative of [the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination] is· void, and the witness imprisoned by an 
order made in excess of the court's authority is entitled to be discharged • • • ."). 
For the proposition that an order is "lawful" within the meaning of the con-
tempt statute unless the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it, see Cox, supra note 
103, at 87. Cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 361 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). See also 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 517, 520 (1968). 
119. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1958); 
United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Cusson, 132 
F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1942). 
120. It is perhaps not inappropriate to regard the defendants in these cases as 
engaging in legitimate acts of law formation. See note 112 supra. 
121. See, e.g., cases cited note 103 supra. 
122. See Cox, supra note 103; Rodgers, supra note 103. 
123. See note 112 supra. 
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illustrate the distinction between violations of court orders and 
violations of statutes. 
The potential illustrative or symbolic value of a separate ini-
tiating process for criminal contempts also may assist in the develop-
ment of criteria for determining whether to initiate contempt pro-
ceedings. The administration of criminal justice in general would 
be qualitatively improved if prosecutorial discretion were exercised 
on the basis of specified, articulable criteria.124 Even if the executive 
and the judiciary would exercise prosecutorial discretion in con-
tempt cases in a similar manner, the criteria for the exercise of that 
discretion arguably should be different in some respects from the 
criteria utilized in determining whether to initiate an ordinary 
criminal prosecution. For example, if a statute is so frequently 
violated that it no longer represents community values, or if an 
individual openly violates a law he thinks is invalid in order to ex-
press his view that the law should be changed, a prosecutor might 
appropriately decide that the law is so questionable or the violator's 
motives so righteous that criminal prosecution is inappropriate. 
These factors, however, are arguably irrelevant when one violates 
a court order, at least if the court's jurisdiction to issue the order is 
clear. Instead, in the case of a court order violation, it may be ap-
propriate to consider such factors as the extent of the violator's 
opportunity for judicial review in light of the detriment to him 
from obeying the order and the use or availability of the civil 
contempt sanction to deal with the conduct. The development 
and articulation of such differing criteria may be advanced by allo-
cating initiating discretion to separate institutional bodies. 
Apart from practical, political considerations, which will be 
discussed in the following section120 and which may exist regardless 
of the legal effect of violating ~n invalid court order, a separate 
initiating process for criminal contempts based on the unique 
nature of court orders can be justified only because of its symbolic 
value, and this is not a sufficient justification for at least two reasons. 
First, the symbolic value with respect to the development of ini-
tiating criteria is at best speculative: Prosecutors develop and 
utilize differing initiating criteria for different types of crimes,120 
124. See ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUI'ION FUNCTION § 2.5 (1971): PRESIDENT'S 
COMMN. ON I.AW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSI'ICE, TASK FORCE ON 
THE COURTS 7-8 (1967). 
125. See text at notes 127-48 infra. 
126. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 NW, U. L. REV. 
174 (1965). 
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and there is no reason to expect that they would be less likely to 
make relevant distinctions in the contempt area. In addition, there 
is no evidence to suggest that judicial initiation of contempts has 
contributed to the articulation of initiating criteria in the past, and 
there is no reason to expect that it will in the future. 
The symbolic value to the potential contemnor is at least as 
questionable: The mere fact that a contempt proceeding may be 
initiated by the court without information or indictment is un-
likely to enhance the contemnor's understanding of the duty to 
obey a court order. I£ the unique initiating procedure has any 
impact on him, it is more likely to be a perception that he can be 
deprived of rights available to other criminal defendants. This raises 
the second problem ·with allowing judicial initiation of criminal 
contempts for symbolic purposes-the appearance of unfairness. 
Just as maintaining integrity and the appearance of integrity in the 
judicial proce~s should be a sufficient reason to reject the fact of 
injury rationale for allowing judicial initiation of criminal con-
tempts, it should be a sufficient reason to reject a rationale based 
on speculative symbolic considerations. 
3. Practical Considerations 
. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for retaining discretion to ini-
tiate criminal contempts in the judiciary is a practical one. Crimi-
nal contempt cases would represent only a small portion of the business 
in a prosecutor's office,127 and any injury from a contempt often 
might seem less serious to the prosecutor than that resulting from 
the commission of a serious crime. An overburdened prosecutor 
might therefore tend to ignore or treat lightly contumacious con-
duct, unless it involved a serious breach of the peace or interfered 
with an ongoing criminal investigation. In contrast, the judiciary is 
more likely to be sensitive to the seriousness of all contempts because 
they constitute affronts to its authority. 
This argument is admittedly speculative. It is not clear that prose-
127. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts includes in its Annual 
Report the number of criminal contempt cases disposed of each year. In 1973 there 
were only 56 such cases in 90 judicial districts. 1973 Annual Report of the Director 
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hereinafter Annual Report], 
in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 5-6, 1973, AND SEPT. 13-14, 1973, at 409 (1974). 
There is no indication of the number of criminal contempt cases filed. Hml'.ever, 
since contempt proceedings are relatively summary, there is probably a close corre-
lation between the number of cases initiated and the number disposed of in any 
given year. 
For a comment on the accuracy of the Administrative Office's statistics, see note 
134 infra. 
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cutors would be more reluctant than courts to initiate criminal 
contempt proceedings. Moreover, as noted previously,128 prose-
cutorial control over the initiating decision would enhance at least 
the appearance of fairness in contempt cases. Nevertheless, uncer-
tainty as to how the prosecutor might react to contempts is perhaps 
a sufficient reason for the judiciary not to relinquish completely its 
control over the initiating function. 
A partial response to this argument is that courts, while they 
have expressed the need for authority to exercise the contempt 
power independently of legislative action,129 have rarely voiced 
concern over the possible abuses of the initiating power by the execu-
tive.130 On the contrary, courts have suggested that the method of 
initiation is not a critical aspect of the contempt power,181 and 
have acquies~ed in executive initiation of criminal contempt 
proceedings.132 
More importantly, there is evidence that prosecutors would 
not ignore contumacious conduct. In a number of recalcitrant 
witness criminal contempt cases under rule 42(b), the prosecutor 
initially sought the contempt citation,133 and prosecutors interviewed 
in conjunction with this study134 invariably stated that they were 
128. See text at notes 98-100 supra. 
129. See cases cited note 2 supra. 
130. But see O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1942), revd. 
on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943). 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir. 1971) (con-
tention that use of indictment violates rule 42(b) without merit); Kienle v. Jewel 
Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1955) (court or prosecutor, not private person, 
is appropriate party to take action against criminal contcmnors). 
132. See cases cited note 28 supra. 
133. E.g., United States v. De Simone, 267 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 
U.S. 827 (1959); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1956). 
134. The interviews, which focused on the use of the contempt power to deal 
with recalcitrant witnesses, were conducted by the author with 18 current or 
recently resigned federal prosecutors in six cities: Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, De-
troit, New York, and Washington, D.C. The interviews averaged 30 to 40 minutes 
each. Most of those interviewed were extremely cooperative, but none was able to 
give precise statistical data about the use of the contempt sanction over a long period 
of time. Such data does not exist in any readily available form. The annual reports 
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts list the 
number of criminal contempt cases disposed of each year, but do not indicate the 
number of dvil contempt cases filed or disposed of, or subdivide the criminal con-
tempt cases among the various types of contumacious conduct. See, e.g., Annual 
Report, supra note 127, at 409. Furthermore, it is .not clear that these statistics arc 
accurate. Although the interviewees confirmed that there were very few contempt 
cases of either type, see note 127 supra, both prosecutors and staff members in sev-
eral clerk of court offices were uncertain as to how contempt cases were filed. Appar-
ently, they are sometimes given separate docket numbers and files and sometimes 
merely noted as part of the principal case. The variation in treatment docs not 
necessarily relate to whether the contempt is civil or criminal or whether the contempt 
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responsible for the initiation of contempt cases against recalcitrant 
grand jury witnesses.135 Indeed, most of the prosecutors viewed 
themselves, and not the judges, as possessing the power to decide 
whether to initiate contempt proceeding"S in these cases.136 
Even in criminal contempt cases, including recalcitrant witness 
cases, that are initiated by the court upon its own motion137 or at 
the request of a private party138 or a government official not asso-
ciated with a prosecutor's office,139 there is little if any reason to 
believe that the effect of removing judicial initiating discretion 
would be detrimental.140 A prosecutor is not likely to jeopardize 
his working relationship with the judiciary by refusing reasonable 
involves a particular type of conduct, and the practices seem to vary not only from 
office to office but also within particular offices. There apparently has been no 
attempt by either the Justice Department or the courts to make the filing system 
uniform. 
Despite the absence of empirical data and the limited number of interviews, the 
information reported here is probably reliable. Although some prosecutors are more 
willing than others to condone a witness' recalcitrance, and although recalcitrant 
witness problems arise more frequently in some judicial districts than in others, 
the interviews revealed substantial uniformity in approaches to recalcitrant witness 
problems in situations in which the recalcitrance is not simply condoned. See note 
136 infra and accompanying text. There is no reason to believe that the views and 
experiences of the prosecutors interviewed are not representative of current federal 
practice. 
The interviews were given with the understanding that the interviewees would 
remain anonymous. To honor this understanding, the information reported here will 
be limited to general conclusions and impressions. 
135. No prosecutor could recall more than three or four recalcitrant witness cases 
in his judicial district in any year, and most of these involved grand jury ·witnesses. 
Although in these cases the prosecutors usually sought coercive civil contempt sanc-
tions, they indicated that their role in initiating the proceedings does not depend 
upon whether the contempt is civil or criminal. On the differences benveen civil and 
criminal contempts, see notes 149-73 infra and accompanying text. 
136. Since a prosecutor is unlikely to seek a court order commanding a grand 
jury witness' cooperation unless he is prepared to follow through · with a contempt 
proceeding in the event of continued recalcitrance, the decision whether to seek the 
court order is usually the critical one. Most of the prosecutors maintained, however, 
that even after an order is issued, they retain control over the decision whether to 
proceed with a contempt action, and at least as a practical matter, they were prob-
ably correct. After the judge issues the order to testify, the witness usually will 
return to the grand jury room for further questioning, and, as the prosecutors 
pointed out, judges generally do not inquire whether their orders to testify are 
obeyed. If a witness still refuses to testify, the judge will probably not become 
aware of the contempt unless the prosecutor calls the refusal to his attention. If 
the prosecutor seeks a contempt sanction, his request will rarely be refused. Cf. note 
147 infra and accompanying text. 
137. E.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Pace, 371 
F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967). 
138. E.g., In re Fletcher, 107 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 
(1940). 
139. E.g., FTC v. Gladstone, 450 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Rico, 182 
F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1950). 
140. But see WORKING P.Al'ERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. 
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judicial requests for the initiation of contempt proceedings,141 and 
the fact that prosecutors do not appear to avoid requests from other 
agencies for perjury and obstruction of justice prosecutions142 sug-
gests that they probably would not ignore agencies' requests for 
contempt prosecutions.143 Whether prosecutors would be equally 
willing to initiate contempt cases at the request of a private citizen 
is unclear._ However, even if they would be less responsive to such 
requests, it is doubtful that any serious incidents of contumacious 
conduct would remain unpunished. If the contempt were serious, 
the agency or court before which the conduct occurred or the court 
whose order was violated would also probably urge prosecution. 
If there is any danger in giving initiating discretion over con-
tempts to the executive, it is that prosecutors may initiate contempt 
proceedings that should not be pursued.144 The contempt sanction 
has sometimes been utilized as a device to suppress dissident ac-
tivity, 145 and the Justice Department on at least one occasion 
apparently considered this an appropriate use of the power.140 Par-
141. The limited experience in Colorado, where criminal contempts are routinely 
initiated by indictment, lends some support to this proposition. See note 98 supra. 
But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 626, suggesting that a prosecutor "might 
well [exercise his discretion not to prosecute] • • • where the contumacious conduct 
was favorable to his cause" [e.g., where a witness refuses to provide evidence that 
will be helpful to a criminal defendant]. If such inaction occurs in situations in 
which the court has no knowledge of the contumacious conduct, see, e.g., note 136 
supra, maintaining initiating discretion in the judiciary does not make imposition 
of an appropriate contempt sanction more likely. If, on the other hand, the court 
requests prosecution, it seems unlikely that a prosecutor would be less willing to 
honor that request than a request to forgo prosecution. Cf. "\VoRKING PAPERS, supra, 
at 625 ("[I]t is not likely that a United States Attorney would prosecute if the court 
informally let it be known that a prosecution was unwarranted •••• "). In addition, 
if there is not sufficient justification for giving the judiciary initiating discretion 
over other cases in which the prosecutor has a potential conflict of interest, cf. note 
100 supra &: note 211 infra, there would appear to be no reason to do so in con-
tempt cases. 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1971) (perjury 
prosecution Jor false testimony in SEC investigation); United States v. Alo, 439 F,2d 
751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971) (obstruction of justice prosecution 
for giving false and evasive answers in SEC investigation), 
143. In any event, most contempt proceedings to enforce agency processes are civil 
rather than criminal. See Bartosic & Lanoff, supra note 11, at 262; Note, Use of 
Contempt Power To Enforce Subpoenas and Orders of Administrative Agencies, 'll 
HARv. L. REv. 1541, 1555 (1958). Thus, a reallocation of initiating discretion for 
criminal contempts from the judiciary to the executive would have little, if any, 
impact on agency practices and policies. 
144. See "\\ToRKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625. 
145. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 7-9. See also Healey v. United States, 186 
F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950), 
Consider also the fears expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Frank v. United States, 
395 U.S. 147, 153-54 (dissenting opinion). 
146. See Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1950) (Denman, 
C.J., supplemental opinion), 
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ticularly in recalcitrant ·witness cases that arise in the grand jury 
context, prosecutors are likely to have a more direct interest than 
the court in ensuring that the contumacious conduct is punished, 
and a requirement of judicial initiation in these instances could 
minimize potential abuses of power. However, since courts tradi-
tionally have not exercised such a restraining infl.uence,147 it is 
doubtful that transferring the initiating function from the judiciary 
to the executive would aggravate these abuses. Furthermore, the 
potential for prosecutorial abuse of this nature is not limited to 
contempt cases but can arise in any situation in which a prosecutor 
has a particularly zealous attitude toward the matter at issue.148 The 
fear of unwarranted prosecutions therefore is not a sufficient basis 
for treating criminal contempts differently from other criminal 
prosecutions. 
4. Benefits of Executive Initiating Discretion 
The discussion has already suggested one important benefit of 
executive initiating discretion: enhancing the fairness or at least the 
appearance of fairness in criminal contempt proceedings. A second 
substantial benefit would be the elimination of the confusion that 
often exists with respect to whether a contempt proceeding is civil 
or criminal. 
The inherent judicial power to punish for' contempt includes the 
power to impose both criminal and civil contempt penalties,149 but 
147. There appears to be only one reported case in which a court denied a 
federal prosecutor's request for a contempt citation: Ex parte McLeod, 120 F. 130 
(N.D. Ala. 1903). Cf. Note, supra note 63, at 184-85. 
148. See note 100 supra. 
149. Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8e Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-52 (1911). 
Except for 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970), which was enacted as part of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970 and which applies only to contemnors who refuse to testify 
before grand juries or other judicial bodies, there is no federal statute dealing spe-
cifically with civil contempts. This raises the question whether section 401, see text at 
notes 17-25 supra, is applicable to civil as well as criminal contempts. The answer is 
probably affirmative. In Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947), the Supreme 
Court, although explicitly refusing to decide the issue, assumed for the purpose of its 
decision that the fine or imprisonment limitation was applicable to civil contempts, 
and in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 382 (1919) (dictum), the Court, without 
specifying the particular statutory provision, apparently relied on section 401(l)'s 
predecessor in suggesting that perjury in the presence of a court does not constitute 
civil contempt. Cf. United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998, 
1000 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum); Special Comm. of the Junior Barristers of the Los 
Angeles Bar Assn., Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 
167, 169 (1955). See also note 150 infra. But see Griffin v. County School Board, 363 
F.2d 206, 210-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966); In re Sixth 8e Wisconsin 
Tower, Inc., 108 F.2d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1939) (Evans, J., concurring). 
In some situations, the availability of a civil contempt sanction may preclude the 
use of a criminal contempt penalty, even though the conduct falls within section 401. 
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there are substantial differences between the two types of contempt. 
In contrast to the punitive objective of the criminal contempt 
sanction, civil contempt remedies are designed to compensate parties 
injured by violations of court orders or to coerce compliance with 
such orders.150 When the objective is coercion, the sanction may be 
either (I) a fine that is payable absent compliance by a certain 
date151 or that increases with continued noncompliance,162 or (2) a 
jail sentence that will terminate when the contemnor indicates a 
willingness to obey the order.163 Since both the compensatory and 
coercive contempt sanctions are viewed as equitable civil remedies,164 
the contempts need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;161i the 
In Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), which involved the refusal of a 
witness to testify before a grand jury, the Court stated by way of dictum that "the 
trial judge [must] first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the im-
position of civil contempt. The judge should resort to criminal sanctions only after 
he determines for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 384 
U.S. at 371 n.9. To date, however, there are no reported cases in which a court has 
relied on the Shillitani dictum to refuse a request to have a defendant held in criminal 
contempt. But cf. United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1202 (2d Cir. 1973) (short period 
of time remaining for purgation is sufficient indication of the inappropriateness of 
the civil sanction). 
150. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); United States v. UMW, 
330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43, 
448-49 (1911). 
Judicial declarations that the purpose of the civil contempt sanctions is to coerce 
compliance with or compensate for the violation of court orders are probably merely 
descriptive of the fact that most civil contempt cases arise after the violation of a 
court order and do not imply a limitation on the availability of civil contempt to 
deal with other types of contumacious conduct. See Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 
908 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 898 (1950); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 
(1919). But cf. In re Sixth &: Wisconsin Tower, 108 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1939). 
151. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 305 (1947) (fine payable unless con• 
tempt purged within five days); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 
F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1958) (in addition to compensatory fine, defendant ordered to 
pay fixed fine for each future violation). But cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 
364, 370-71 n.6 (1966) (dictum that a fixed term of imprisonment to commence if 
the contemnor fails to purge himself within a specified time may not be an appro-
priate civil contempt sanction). 
152. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974). 
153. See, e.g., In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 
(1965). 
Since the purpose of the sanction is solely coercive, the penalty cannot extend 
beyond the time when compliance becomes impossible, Shillitani v. United States, 
384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); Loubriel v. United 
States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926), and in the case of witnesses who refuse to testify 
before grand juries and other judicial bodies, the maximum period of incarceration 
may not exceed 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). Thus, a recalcitrant grand jury 
witness who refuses to purge himself of the contempt would be released at the expi• 
ration of the grand jury term or after 18 months, whichever occurs first. On the 
length of grand jury terms, see 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970); FED, R. CRIM, P. 6(g). 
154. See cases cited note 150 supra. 
155. Civil contempt must be proved by something more than a preponderance of 
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contemnor does not have the right to a jury trial;166 and whereas 
the rules of appellate review for criminal judgments are applicable 
to criminal contempts,167 civil contempt judgments are appealable 
in accordance with the rules applicable to civil judgments.168 
Despite these differences, both civil and criminal contempts 
usually are initiated by an oral or written judicial order to show 
cause.um For this reason, and because the violation of a court order 
may appear to warrant either a criminal or a civil sanction, or 
both,160 it is often unclear whether the proceeding is for criminal or 
civil contempt.161 
Prior to the adoption of rule 42, courts tended to classify con-
tempts as civil or criminal according to such factors as the title of 
the evidence but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Oriel v. 
Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1928); Schauffier v. Local 1291, ILA, 292 F.2d 182, 189-90 
(3d Cir. 1961); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 
1943). See also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 251-53. 
156. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 175; Dobbs, supra note 8, at 231-34. 
157. Annot., 24 AL.R.3d 650, 663-74 (1969). 
158. See generally Annot., 33 AL.R.3d 448 (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970) 
(appeal from civil contempt judgment for refusal to testify before grand jury or other 
judicial body must be disposed of within at least 30 days of the filing of the appeal). 
159. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 
1958). 
Occasionally coercive civil contempt sanctions are imposed without prior notice and 
hearing, and the federal prosecutors interviewed for this study, see note 134 supra, indi-
cated that this practice was common in recalcitrant witness cases. See, e.g., In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1971) affd. sub nom. Gelbard v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); In re October 1969 Grand Jury, 435 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 
1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970) provides that coercive civil contempt penalties may 
be."summarily'' imposed against recalcitrant witnesses; it is unclear, however, whether 
this provision is intended to authorize the imposition of a civil contempt penalty 
without notice and hearing. The legislative history suggests that the statute was 
"designed to codify present practice." See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007, 
4022. At least two cases have held that a grand jury witness charged with civil con-
tempt is entitled to the same notice and opportunity to prepare a defense that is 
provided criminal contemnors by rule 42(b). In re Sadin, Docket No. 74-2003 (2d Cir. 
Jan. 23, 1975); United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. United 
States v. Boe, 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974). But see In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1162 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1974); In re October 1969 Grand 
Jury, 435 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1970). . 
160. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1955); United States v. UMW, 330 
U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947). If the procedural requirements for 'criminal contempts are 
complied with, both a civil and a criminal contempt penalty may be imposed in the 
same proceeding. 330 U.S. at 299. Section 401's limitation on the penalty to fine or 
imprisonment will not preclude a ti.De for one offense and imprisonment for the other. 
See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947). Cf. MacNiel v. United States, 236 
F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956). 
161. See, e.g., Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1966) (remand to determine 
if contempt criminal or civil). Cf. United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633, 
636-37 (D. Mont. 1957). On the general difficulty of distinguishing between criminal 
and civil contempts, see Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441•52 
(1911); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2; at 49-67. ' 
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the proceeding,162 whether the defendant testified,163 the nature of 
the relief sought164 or granted,165 and who conducted the prosecu-
tion.166 The controlling factor would vary from case to case, and 
the labeling might occur for the first time on appeal, when classifica-
tion of the contempt as civil or criminal was necessary to decide a 
procedural issue.167 In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,168 
Judge Learned Hand pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of the 
tests for distinguishing the two types of contempt and suggested 
that there should and can be "some simple and certain tests by 
which the character of the prosecution can be determined."100 The 
promulgation of rule 42(b), which provides that the notice to the 
defendant "shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal 
contempt charged and describe it as such,"170 was in part a response 
to Judge Hand's criticism.171 It has proved, however, to be an in-
effective response. Courts have held that the failure to label the 
charge as criminal does not preclude the imposition of a criminal 
penalty,172 and even if the proceeding is clearly designated as crim-
inal, an appellate court may nonetheless conclude that the contempt 
was civil.178 
so· long as distinct civil and criminal contempt sanctions remain 
available to deal with the same conduct, the best way to avoid the 
confusion ben'leen the two remedies is to distinguish more clearly 
the initiating processes for each. Giving the executive initiating 
discretion over criminal contempts would accomplish this task. 
Since the prosecutor would initiate all criminal contempts pursuant 
to an indictment or information, there would be no need for rule 
42(b) initiation, and the existence of an indictment or information 
would clearly indicate that the contempt was criminal.174 The de-
162. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Housel, 288 F. 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1923). 
163. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 F. 926, 929-30 (1st Cir. 1917). 
164. See, e.g., Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220 (1932). 
165. See, e.g., In re Merchants' Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912). 
166. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (2d Cir. 1913), See In re Eskay, 122 F,2d 819, 
822-23 (3d Cir. 1941); R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 62-64. 
167. See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-44 (1941); In re Merchants' 
Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912); In re Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935). 
Cf. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947). 
168. 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1936). 
169. 80 F.2d at 214. 
170. (Emphasis added.) See note 27 supra. 
171. See Notes of Advisory Committee, 18 U.S.C.A. FED. R. CRu1r. P. 42 (1961). 
172. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 297-98 (1947); FI'C v. Gladstone, 450 
F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971). 
173. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966), 
174. Since there is no precedent for adjudicating civil claims in ordinary criminal 
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fenclant would know in advance that a finding of contempt would 
result in a criminal penalty, and the rules of trial and appellate 
procedure would be clear from the outset. Since criminal penalties 
could not 'be imposed in the absence of an indictment or informa-
tion, there would be no opportunity for a judge to frustrate an 
aggrieved party's coercive objective by treating the application for 
a conditional sanction as a criminal contempt.175 
Executive control over initiation may also lead to a more sys-
tematic treatment of criminal contempts: Since a court could not 
require a prosecutor to litigate a contempt action,176 the prosecutor 
could evaluate the importance of particular cases in light of other 
demands on his time. If one assumes that prosecutors will react as 
responsibly to contempt allegations as to allegations of other types 
of criminal conduct, this would result in a better and more efficient 
allocation of prosecutorial resources. In addition, recognition that 
the executive is responsible for the initiation of all criminal con-
tempts may cause prosecutors to develop a more systematic approach 
to initiating decisions; which they may currently treat in a relatively 
ad hoc fashion merely because contempts are perceived as sui generis 
offenses. 
Since prosecutors already exercise de facto initiating discretion 
in many contempt cases,177 formal transfer of initiating discretion to 
the executive may not have a substantial impact on current prac-
tices. Moreover, since contempt cases arise infrequently in most 
judicial districts,178 it may be difficult to avoid an ad hoc approach 
to initiating decisions regardless of who has formal initiating power. 
Nevertheless, granting initiating discretion to the executive would 
provide at least the potential for a more systematic treatment of 
contempts. 
cases, the decision to treat criminal contempts as other crimes for the purpose of 
initiation presumably would preclude the imposition of both civil and criminal con-
tempt sanctions in the same proceeding. Although the Supreme Court approved the 
practice of imposing both types of sanctions in a single proceeding in United States v. 
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947), it also suggested that the better practice is to try the 
contempts separately. 330 U.S. at 299. Cf. United States v. Consolidated Prods., Inc., 
326 F. Supp. 603, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
175. In Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 588 (1947), the district court had refused 
to grant the coercive relief requested by the SEC and instead imposed a "flat uncon-
ditional fine of $50.00 •••• " 
176. Courts commonly appoint United States attorneys to prosecute criminal con-
tempt cases. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 384 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1967), affd., 
395 U.S. 147 (1969). For a strong criticism of the appointment of counsel for an oppos-
ing party to prosecute a criminal contempt action, see Brotherhood of Locomotive 
J;ircmen &: Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 318-20 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Kienle 
v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 344 U.S. 918 (1955). 
177. See text at notes 133-36 supra. 
178. See note 127 supra. 
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Finally, transferring initiating discretion to the executive could 
assist in removing an ambiguity as to the applicability of the double 
jeopardy clause179 to criminal contempts. To date, the Supreme 
Court has not fully extended the prohibition against double jeopardy 
to criminal contempts, and several early contempt cases, relying on 
the sui generis characterization of contempts, state that the same 
act may be punished both as a criminal contempt and as an ordi-
nary crime.180 While the continued validity of these cases is ques-
tionable in light of the Court's recent expansion of the constitutional 
rights due to criminal contemnors181 and its expansion of the scope of 
the double jeopardy clause in noncontempt contexts,182 the cases have 
not been specifically repudiated.183 Were the Court to require execu-
tive initiation by holding that criminal contempts are indistinguish-
able from other criminal prosecutions, presumably the double 
jeopardy clause would be fully applicable.184 
5. Methods of Limiting Judicial Control over the 
Initiating Function 
a. Judicial action. No legislation is necessary to transfer the 
initiating function for criminal contempts from the judiciary to 
the executive. The judiciary could accomplish this result by several 
methods, each of which has ample precedential support. First, it 
could explicitly recognize that judicial initiation of criminal con-
tempts is the only significant difference between contempts and 
other crimes and that there is no necessity for the unique rule 42(b) 
initiating procedures. On this basis, the Supreme Court could hold 
that all criminal contempts not summarily punishable pursuant to 
rule 42(a) are "crimes" within the meaning of the fifth amendment 
179. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. 
180. See O'Malley v. United States; 128 F.2d 676, 684 (8th Cir. 1942), reod. on other 
grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); Merchants' Stock 
&: Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F. 20, 27 (8th Cir. 1912). Cf. Jurney v. MacCracken, 
294 U.S. 125, 151-52 (1935); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897); Chicago 
Directory Co. v. United States Directory Co., 123 F. 194 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903): United 
States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 
(1943), discussed in Dobbs, supra note 8, at 242. 
181. See text at notes 35-51 supra. 
182. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (rejection of dual sovereignty theory 
as a basis for allowing both a state and a municipality within the state to impose 
criminal penalties for the same act); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) 
(protection against double jeopardy is fundamental right within the meaning of due 
process of law). See also Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9 (1972). 
183, But see United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
184. Even if the nonconstitutional methods suggested in the next section, see text 
at notes 193-213 infra, were utilized to require or encourage executive initiation of 
criminal contempts, the resulting assimilation of aiminal contempts with other crimes 
would tend to undermine the proposition that criminal contempts are sui generis and 
therefore not within the scope of the protection against double jeopardy. 
January 1975] Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power 521 
grand jury provision as well as all of the other constitutional and 
nonconstitutional provisions generally applicable to crimes and 
criminal prosecutions.185 There are, however, three potential prob-
lems with this approach: 
First, the application of the grand jury provision to criminal 
contempts could affect the courts' sentencing discretion in criminal 
contempt cases. This matter will be considered below.186 
Second, relinquishing the claim to inherent contempt power 
may entail unwarranted risks. Subsequently enacted legislation that 
unduly restricts the contempt sanction, or executive insensitivity to 
the effect of contumacious conduct, could force the Court to re-
evaluate its position and to attempt to justify a reversal of or excep-
tion to its earlier decision.187 Furthermore, the argument against 
judicial exercise of the initiating function may not be as compelling 
for all types of contempt cases as it is for recalcitrant witness cases, 
where the prosecutor often exercises de facto initiating discretion. 
These risks, however, are probably minimal. There is little reason 
to believe that prosecutors would irresponsibly exercise their discre-
tion in nonwitness contempt cases,188 and the problem of restrictive 
legislative action can be anticipated by clearly basing the holding 
on the adequacy of existing legislation. 
Finally, there is the problem of overruling the substantial prece-
dent approving rule 42 and basing contemnors' constitutional pro-
tections on notions of due process rather than on the more specific 
185. This alternative is based on the assumption that prosecutors would be able 
to initiate proceedings for violations of section 401 by indictment or information. The 
possibility that section 401 may be interpreted to preclude independent executive 
initiation of contempts is considered at note 206 infra and accompanying text. 
186. See text at notes 216-56 infra. 
187. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. 
R.Ev. 211. 
188. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. Perhaps the greatest risk is 
that attorneys may not be punished for their misconduct. Prosecutors may be reluc-
tant to initiate contempt proceedings against other members of the bar and especially 
against colleagues in their own offices. Trial courts, however, have sometimes abused 
their discretion in exercising contempt power against defense attorneys, see, e.g., 
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972), and courts generally do not utilize the contempt power against prosecutors. 
See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEXAS L. 
R.Ev. 629, 674 (1972); Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How 
It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227, 276 (1968). Nevertheless, it is arguable that judicial 
abuses of the contempt power could be substantially minimized by the elimination 
of rule 42(a) initiating procedures and that prosecutors should be no more immune 
from the contempt sanction than other attorneys. Cf. N. DoRSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 9, at 186-87, 226-38. If one accepts these propositions, there may be a limited 
role for the exercise of inherent judicial contempt power. Although the possibility 
of unwarranted refusals to prosecute does not exist only in the case of misconduct by 
attorneys, see notes 100 supra &: 211 infra, that possibility coupled with the recog-
nition that an attorney, as an officer of the court, has a special obligation to preserve 
and maintain respect for the judiciary, see N. DoRSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 144, 
522 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 73:484 
prov1S1ons of the Bill of Rights.180 The complete assimilation of 
criminal contempts with other crimes could be viewed merely as 
the final step in a consistent progression of judicial decisions that 
have gradually eroded the distinctions between contempts and other 
crimes.180 However, one might take the position that the long tradi-
tion of evaluating contempt procedures by standards of due process 
should not be rejected in the absence of some compelling necessity,181 
and that the benefits of placing initiating discretion with the exec-
utive, although substantial, are not sufficient to justify the overruling 
of extensive prior authority.102 
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to abandon the due process 
precedent in criminal contempt cases, it could still effect a sub-
stantial assimilation of criminal contempts with other crimes by at 
least one and possibly two methods. First, the Court could submit 
to Congress an amendment to rule 42 that would eliminate para-
graph (b) and require that all criminal contempts not punishable 
pursuant to rule 42(a) be initiated in the same manner as other 
criminal prosecutions. Unless Congress rejected the amendment 
within ninety days, it would become law.103 
Second, just as it did in initially applying the jury trial right to 
criminal contempts,1°4 the Court perhaps could rely on its super-
visory power over federal courts185 to hold that criminal contempts 
not punishable pursuant to rule 42(a) must be initiated by indict-
ment or information. It is unclear, however, whether the imposition 
of such a requirement is within the scope of the Court's supervisory 
power.196 The limits of that power are not clearly de:fined,187 and 
is arguably a sufficient basis to justify the use of inherent contempt power in cases of 
attorney misconduct. 
189. See text at notes 43-45 supra. 
190. Compare the gradual (but not yet complete) assimilation of criminal con, 
tempts with other crimes, see text at notes 35-51 supra, with the !'requirements of 
later precedent" rationale for overruling earlier precedent discussed in Israel, supra 
note 187, at 223-26, 242-61. But cf. text at notes 216-19 infra. 
191. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192-93 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). Cf. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650-52 (1895) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
192. Whether the benefits of executive initiation and the lack of necessity £or utiliz-
ing rule 42(b) procedures provide sufficient bases for overruling the due process 
precedents depends primarily on one's views as to the role of precedent in judicial 
decision-making. See generally Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Consti-
tutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 589 (1931); Israel, supra note 187, at 215-19, Compare 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion with Justice Black's dissenting opinion in 
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189-219 (1958). 
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970). See l C. WRIGHT 8: A. MILLER, supra note 114, § 4. 
194. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966). 
195. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
196. There is no explicit constitutional grant of supervisory power to the Supreme 
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the precedent for joint judicial and legislative action to adopt and 
amend the Federal Rules provides a basis for argq.ing that the 
Court cannot take unilateral action that, in effect, would constitute 
an amendment to rule 42.198 Even if the Court believed that it had 
such power, it might be reluctant to pursue a course of action that 
bypasses the established procedures for congressional approval of 
amendments to the Rules.199 
Prior to any action by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, 
without overruling past precedent or becoming completely depen-
dent upon the executive's initiating decisions, could effect a signifi-
cant restriction on the judicial power to decide whether to initiate 
criminal contempts. As early as 1821 the Supreme Court recognized 
that the rationale for the exercise of the contempt power was neces-
sity and, therefore, that its use should be limited to "the least pos-
sible power adequate to the end proposed."200 Although courts have 
not always been consistent in observing this dictum,201 the Supreme 
Court has referred to it in judicial contempt cases to stress the im-
Court. To the extent that the Court has supervisory power not explicitly granted to 
it by Congress, the power exists as an inherent judicial power. See Note, supra note 
71, at 1051•52. Whether such power extends to changing the method for initiating 
criminal contempts is the question whether change should be viewed as an exercise 
of judicial power or as an exercise of legislative power. See id. at 1051-56. Cf. Levin 
&: Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Consti-
tutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958). See also Hyde, From Common Law 
Rules to Rules of Court, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 187 (1937). 
197. See Note, supra note 71. 
198. It is arguable, however, that the power to make and amend procedural rules 
is, at least to some extent, an inherent judicial power. See Pound, supra note 71, at· 
601; Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitu-
tionally, 23 Ju,. L. REv. 276 (1928). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT 8c A. Mru.ER, supra 
note 114, § 1001. 
199. A third possibility is a holding by the Supreme Court that the potential for 
bias or the appearance of unfairness that results from the vesting of initiating dis-
cretion over contempts with the judiciary, see text at notes 97-100 supra, violates the 
contemnor's right to due process. The Court's recent concern with the appearance 
of unfairness that results when a judge before whom a contempt is committed sits 
in judgment over the contemnor, see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1974), 
reemphasizes that due process requires maintaining the appearance of fairness. How-
ever, there may be a substantial difference, at least for the purposes of due process, 
between the appearance of unfairness that results from allowing a judge with prior 
knowledge of contumacious conduct to try, convict, and sentence the contemnor, and 
the appearance of unfairness that results merely from the fact that the judiciary may 
exercise initiating discretion in contempt cases. Furthermore, it is by no means clear 
that even a judge's prior knowledge of the contempt necessarily would require his 
disqualification. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501-02. 
200. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821). Although Dunn dealt 
with the congressional contempt power, the Supreme Court has stated that the "least 
possible power" principle also should govern the exercise of judicial contempt power. 
In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). 
201. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), overruled in Harris v. 
_ United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
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portance of ensuring that a contemnor not be denied important 
procedural rights.202 It would be consistent with the spirit of these 
precedents for lower courts, on a case-by-case basis, to refuse to ini-
tiate contempt proceedings203 on the theory that ordinary criminal 
prosecution would be an adequate alternative. Should the prose-
cutor thereafter refuse to initiate proceedings, the court could still 
do so. From this process there could evolve a line of precedent ap-
plicable to broad categories of contumacious conduct. 
A similar but more far-reaching approach would be for the pre-
siding judges in the various judicial districts to establish an informal 
policy of utilizing the indictment process rather than rule 42(b) for 
the initiation of all or certain types of criminal contempts. Such a 
policy has been successfully established through the cooperative 
efforts of the presiding judge and the United States Attorney's office 
in at least one judicial district,204 and the adoption of similar policies 
in other districts would be desirable. 
b. Legislative action. Congress may be able to provide alterna-
tive or additional limitations on the courts' exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in criminal contempt cases. Initially, Congress should 
explicitly provide that violations of section 40 I may be treated as 
ordinary criminal prosecutions. Since section 401 is the only crim-
inal statute that provides that "a court shall have the power to 
punish" the conduct described therein, and since the only signifi-
cant difference between criminal contempts and ordinary criminal 
prosecutions is the different initiating process for each, it is possible 
to interpret that section as a statement only of the courts' power to 
initiate and punish criminal contempts, and not as an ordinary 
criminal statute.205 Viewed in this light, the cases allowing the 
initiation of criminal contempts by indictment are not authority 
for the proposition that violations of section 401 may be treated as 
ordinary criminal prosecutions; rather, they merely represent judi-
cial approval of the prosecutor's decision to initiate proceedings.200 
A more far-reaching step would be for Congress to repeal or 
limit the scope of section 40 I and, at the same time, enact specific 
202. E.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965) (rule 42(a) procedures 
are not available to punish grand jury witness who refuses to testify); In re Michael, 
326 U.S. 224-, 227 (194-5) (mere perjury is not criminal contempt; to allow prosecution 
of perjury would deprive defendant of important procedural safeguards). Cf. United 
States v. Seale, 4-61 F,2d 34-5, 353 (7th Cir. 1972), 
203. Cf. cases cited note 62 supra. 
204-. See note 98 supra. 
205. See note 84- supra. 
206. It is by no means clear that this interpretation of section 401 and the indict-
ment precedents is correct. The only practical difference betiveen viewing section 401 
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criminal statutes (where they do not already exist207) to cover the 
types of conduct currently included therein.208 While complete 
repeal of section 401 may be unacceptable to the Supreme Court,209 
it is reasonable to expect that the Court would uphold legislation 
that eliminates judicial initiating discretion in types of cases in 
which the need for such discretion is most clearly lacking210-for 
example, in recalcitrant ·witness cases not subject to rule 42(a). 
If Congress fears that prosecutors will be reluctant to initiate 
proceedings for some types of contumacious conduct excluded from 
the amended section 401, it could provide that in such cases the 
prosecutor, at the request of a court, must formally initiate pro-
ceedings or at least present the case to the grand jury.211 The 
contempt of Congress statute212 provides precedent for such a re-
quirement. The constitutionality of this legislative restriction on 
prosecutorial discretion apparently has not been challenged, how-
ever, and it is unclear to what extent, if at all, Congress may impose 
such restrictions on the executive's initiating discretion.218 
as merely a statement of the courts' contempt power and viewing it as a statute that 
will support independent executive (as well as judicial) initiation of contempts is 
that the former reading of section 401 would permit courts to exercise discretionary 
power to dismiss contempt indictments. See text at notes 62-63 supra. There is no 
indication, however, that either the judiciary or Congress has vi~ved this discretionary 
power to forgo prosecution as an essential aspect of the courts' contempt power. See 
cases cited note 131 supra. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625. 
207. Such statutes do exist for some types of contumacious conduct. See, e.g., note 
82 supra. 
208. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
209. See text at note 79 supra. See also Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 
65-66 (1924). 
210. See text at notes 78-88 supra. 
211, If there is a reasonable fear that prosecutors may initiate unwarranted pro-
ceedings, the legislation might also require prior judicial approval of the initiating 
decision for types of cases in which abuse is most likely. See PROP, FED. CruM. CoDE, 
supra note 83, § 1349; WoruuNG PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. However, in view of 
the fact that the judiciary generally has not exercised its discretion to refuse prose-
cutors' requests for the initiation of section 401 contempt proceedings, cf. note 147 
supra, the value of such a provision is doubtful. 
Because it would defeat the objective of transferring initiating discretion to the 
executive for Congress to limit the scope of section 401 and at the same time apply 
substantial restrictions on prosecutorial discretion, it should apply such restrictions 
only where there is a likelihood of abuse of discretion, and it should not necessarily 
limit the restrictions to crimes previously punishable under section 401. For example, 
a reasonable fear that prosecutors may not initiate proceedings against witnesses 
whose misconduct is helpful in attaining a conviction, see note 141 supra, may justify 
requiring prosecution upon judicial certification in such situations. 
212. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1970) provides that the Speaker of the House or the President 
of the Senate shall certify facts constituting a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970) (con-
tempt of Congress) to the appropriate United States Attorney, "whose duty it shall 
be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action." See WORKING PAPERS, 
supra note 2, at 625 (congressional certification not only imposes a duty to prosecute, 
but it may be a prerequisite to prosecution). 
213. Perhaps there would be no objection to legislation that merely required the 
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, c. Executive action. Even in the absence of legislative and judi-
cial efforts to limit the use of rule 42, the executive can play a role 
in demonstrating the lack of necessity for unique initiating proce-
dures in criminal contempt cases. Since section 401 contempts may 
be initiated as ordinary criminal prosecutions,214 prosecutors seek-
ing-contempt penalties could simply proceed by way of information 
or indictment. Although there may appear to be little incentive 
for a prosecutor to forgo use of rule 42(b), a prosecutorial policy of 
initiating criminal contempts by information or indictment would 
at least have the benefit of reducing possible confusion over whether 
a contempt is civil or criminal.215 
C. Independence of the Judiciary from the Executive 
and Grand Jury: Sentencing 
The Supreme Court's holding that the fifth amendment right to 
a grand jury indictment is inapplicable to criminal contempts216 is 
prosecutor to present the case to the grand jury. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 
167, 182-85 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Outside 
the contempt area, however, courts have taken the position that deciding whether 
formally to initiate criminal proceedings is a discretionary executive function, and 
that the separation of powers doctrine precludes the judiciary from requiring prose-
cution in particular cases. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 
Although deciding whether to initiate criminal contempt proceedings has been 
treated as a judicial function, it is not clear that this function can be exercised in 
cases involving conduct that, while traditionally within the scope of the courts' con• 
tempt power, is in fact defined as an ordinary criminal offense. On the one hand, it 
may appear to laud form over substance to hold that Congress can grant initiating 
power to the judiciary by defining conduct as falling within the scope of the courts' 
contempt power, but that Congress cannot define the same conduct as an ordinary 
offense (outside the scope of the contempt power) and, at the same time, specifically 
grant the judiciary some control over the initiating decision. On the other hand, 
assuming that Congress' decision to treat the conduct as an ordinary criminal of-
fense tloes not represent an unconstitutional restriction on the courts' inherent con-
tempt power, see text at notes 78-88 supra, the decision to define the conduct as an 
ordinary crime arguably should be determinative of the extent to which the executive 
is able to exercise independent initiating discretion; the fact that the conduct could 
have been defined as within the courts' contempt power should perhaps be irrelevant. 
This latter approach would require both Congress and the courts to deal explicitly 
and separately with the questions of (1) the appropriate scope of the judicial contempt 
power and (2) the extent to which executive prosecutorial discretion over the initiat• 
ing decision in ordinary criminal cases may be limited. Specific focus on these ques-
tions would avoid any gradual erosion of executive prosecutorial discretion through 
a process of legislation and judicial interpretation based solely or primarily on hypo• 
thetical assumptions about what Congress might have been able to do. Cf, United 
States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 
(1943) (statutory presumption unconstitutional because no rational connection between 
fact proved and fact presumed; assertion that Congress had power to proscribe same 
conduct without reference to presumed fact, even if correct, does not vitiate uncon-
stitutionality of statute). 
214. See cases cited note 28 supra. 
215. See note 175 and text at notes 174-75 supra. 
216. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
C 
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not surprising in light of the development of the law of contempt. 
The Court traditionally has begun with the assumption that con-
tempts are sui generis, and that the summary nature of the proce-
dure is limited only by the requirement of fundamental fairness 
implicit in the concept of due process.217 The constitutional right 
to a jury trial was extended to criminal contempts only after the 
Court had concluded that the right was fundamental and applicable 
to state criminal prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment 
due process clause,218 and the Court has never taken that position 
with respect to the grand jury indictment provision.219 Neverthe-
less, as suggested previously,220 the issue should not be whether the 
right to an indictment is fundamental, but whether the rationale 
of necessity, which is the basis for the sui generis classification, 
justifies excluding criminal contempts from the scope of the explicit 
indictment right. This question is considered here independently 
from the question whether initiating discretion should be trans-
ferred to the executive.221 
Since the right to an indictment in criminal contempt cases 
presumably would exist only if the actual penalty exceeded one 
year's imprisonment,222 the question becomes one of determining 
whether there is any necessity for refusing to limit contempt sen-
tences to one year unless the proceedings are initiated by indict-
ment. There are arguably three such reasons: First, the grand jury 
requirement would have a substantial negative impact on the power 
of the judiciary to initiate serious criminal contempt charges; 
second, regardless of whether the judiciary or the executive should 
have initiating discretion, the grand jury, by refusing to return an 
indictment, could restrict the courts' power to punish serious con-
217. See text at notes 35-51 supra. 
218. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Compare Green v. United States, 
356 U.S. 165 (1958) (no constitutional right to jury trial in criminal contempt cases), 
decided prior to Duncan, with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (due process 
requires jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases). Cf. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 
U.S. 373 (1966). 
219. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
220. See text at notes 54-56 supra. 
221. In the absence of a decision to treat criminal contempts as ordinary criminal 
prosecutions for all purposes, it is probably unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
extend the grand jury right to contemnors. The grand jury question, however, is 
distinguishable from the question whether initiating discretion should be transferred 
to the executive. The Court conld make the indictment right applicable to criminal 
contempts on the theory that the grand jury would provide a desirable check on 
judicial initiating discretion. Alternatively, the Court conld continue to hold that 
contemnors are never entitled to a grand jury indictment and, at the same time, 
require executive initiation of contempts. See notes 193-98 supra and accompanying 
text. 
222. See text at notes 65-69 supra. 
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tempts;_ and finally, even if one assumes that the prosecutor should 
have the power to initiate all contempt proceedings, he arguably 
should not have the power to limit the courts' sentencing discretion. 
Yet, if the indictment right were applicable to criminal contempts, 
the· prosecutor could limit the potential maximum sentence to one 
year simply by proceeding by information rather than indictment.2211 
The folio-wing analysis will explore each of these limitations on the 
judiciary and suggest that they would probably be desirable. Since 
there may be disagreement about some of the ramifications of apply-
ing the grand jury right to criminal contempts, however, the section 
will conclude with a brief assessment of alternative approaches to 
the grand jury issue. 
I. The Effect of Granting Contemnors the Right 
to a Grand Jury Indictment 
The indictment requirement would severely inhibit, if not elimi-
nate, the power of the judiciary to initiate serious criminal con-
tempt charges. If a prosecutor were reluctant to present evidence 
of a contempt to the grand jury, the judge could encourage the 
grand jury to develop the evidence without the prosecutor's assis-
tance.224 It is questionable, however, whether the indictment would 
be valid without the prosecutor's signature. The Federal Rules 
require his signature,225 and at least one case226 has held that a 
United States Attorney has the discretionary power to refuse to sign 
an indictment. 
Perhaps a court could avoid these difficulties by relying on its 
inherent power to appoint a special prosecutor or by eliminating 
the signature requirement in contempt cases.227 However, there are 
serious disadvantages in any procedure that allows a judge to bypass 
a reluctant prosecutor. Unless indictments were sought in all judi-
223. See text at notes 69-70 supra. 
224. See O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 
926 (1966). Cf. Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 
N.Y.S. B.J. 397, 399 (1967). 
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(l). 
226. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), 
227. In cases involving violations of statutes other than section 401, the appoint• 
ment by the court of a special prosecutor would probably be viewed as a violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, I'll 
(opinion of the court), 190-93 (Wisdom, J., concurring) (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 935 (1965); Note, The Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 577, 614-15 (1973). However, if one starts with the premise that 
the only limitation on the judiciary's initiating discretion in criminal contempt cases 
is the requirement that a grand jury make a finding of probable cause in serious 
cases, the judiciary's inherent power to exercise initiating discretion arguably includes 
the power to appoint a special prosecutor to present the case to the grand jury and 
to sign the indictment. 
January 1975] Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power 529 
cially initiated contempt cases, an _alternative that seems unduly 
burdensome, the judge's decision to seek an indictment would 
require him to evaluate and to some extent. pre-judge the case prior 
to trial. Even if a different judge conducted the contempt hearing, 
he could be prejudiced by the assessment of seriousness made by the 
initial judge, and this could affect the severity of the subsequent 
sanction.228 While this problem also exists with regard to the jury 
trial right, which similarly must be based on a prior assessment of 
the seriousness of the offense,229 perhaps the importance of that 
right outweighs any danger of prejudice. In contrast, the right to an 
indictment arguably is not sufficiently important to risk the possibil-
ity of pre-judgment bias. 
The difficulty with this argument is the initial premise that the 
judiciary needs the discretionary power to initiate contempt pro-
ceedings that may result in lengthy sentences. A prosecutor's un-
willingness to seek or sign an indictment may indicate that a serious 
sanction is unwarranted. The analysis has already suggested that 
there is little, if any, need for judicial initiating discretion. How~ 
ever, even if one assumes that the judiciary should retain some 
initiating power, it would be desirable to limit the potential penalty 
in judicially initiated contempt cases. The absence of any nonjudi-
cial check on the judiciary's power to initiate and punish affronts to 
its authority creates the potential for bias, and an explicit sen-
tencing limitation at least would make the exercise of the power 
appear less arbitrary. Although the Supreme Court has indicated 
that appellate courts can and should exercise discretion to reduce 
excessive contempt penalties,230 the criteria for the exercise of that 
discretion are extremely vague,231 and appellate courts have ap-
proved a wide range of sentences for what appears to be very similar 
conduct.232 In view of the Court's holding that contempts ar~ not_ 
inherently nonpetty,233 a one-year limitation on the power to sen-
tence contemnors in cases in which the prosecutor -refuses ·to seek 
an indictment does not seem unreasonable. 
A second possible objection to making the grand jury right 
228. It also could affect the fact-finding process in nonjury trials. However, the 
contemnor's sentence cannot exceed six months' imprisonment uuless he is given the 
right to a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
229. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 382 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
UNIFORM R. Cmr. P. 32l(b), Comments 51-56 (Prop. Final Draft, 1974). 
230. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-05 (1947). 
231. Cf. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188-89 (1956). 
232. See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 58 n.11 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting). 
233. See Bloom v, Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 
373 (1966). 
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applicable to contempts is the fear that the grand jury would refuse 
to return an indictment in a case in which either the prosecutor or 
judge, or both, felt that .an individual's conduct deserved a serious 
penalty. Initially, it is questionable whether such a fear is warranted. 
In many contempt cases, there is little doubt as to the existence of 
probable cause,234 and, in any event, it is doubtful that a grand jury 
would not accede to a request for an indictment.28G If the grand 
jury were to refuse to indict, its action might simply reflect a proper 
exercise of the institution's time-honored function as a shield against 
unwarranted prosecution.236 Still, the grand jury may act arbitrarily. 
Given the likely absence of serious probable cause issues, that risk, 
even if minimal, is arguably a sufficient basis for denying the non-
fundamental indictment right to contemnors. 
It should be a sufficient response to this argument to note that a 
grand jury's refusal to indict would not preclude prosecution but 
would limit only the potential penalty. In light of the extremely 
speculative nature of the fear that a grand jury may refuse to indict, 
this is a small price to pay for enhancing the potential fairness, or 
at least the appearance of fairness, of contempt proceedings. 
Finally, even if one assumes that the executive should have the 
power to decide whether to initiate contempt proceedings, it argu-
ably should not be able to limit the courts' sentencing discretion 
to the imposition of a one-year prison term by utilizing an informa-
tion rather than an indictment.237 Prosecutors, however, routinely 
exercise a closely analogous power in noncontempt cases. When-
234. This would probably be true, for example, where the contumacious conduct 
is a refusal to testify. 
235. See Antell, The Modem Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovemment, 51 A.B.A.J. 
153 (1965); Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems, 9 CoLUllf, J. L, 
&: Soc. PROB. 681, 699-702 (1973). See also Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 
10 ORE. L. REv. 295, 325, 330, 363 (1931). But cf. Dession, From Indictment to Infor• 
mation-Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163, 176-79 (1932), 
236. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). 
237. In noncontempt contexts, only the legislature may limit the courts' sentencing 
discretion, and one of the underlying policies _of the double jeopardy ban is the 
prevention of executive interference with legislative and judicial sentencing power, 
See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302-08 (1965). If Congress, for example, 
sets a maximum penalty at ten years' imprisonment, the prosecutor cannot subvert 
that determination by seeking punishment both for the crime and for a lesser in-
cluded offense. Cf. Kirchheimer1 The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE 
L.J. 513, 529-31 (1949), If the court decides that the appropriate penalty is less than 
the maximum, the double jeopardy provision bars the prosecutor from retrying the 
case to obtain a more severe penalty. Cf. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). However, 
as these examples point out, the double jeopardy limitations on executive interference 
with sentencing are designed to protect defendants against executive efforts to in-
ctease criminal penalties. Since the sentencing limitation that would result from the 
use of an information could work only to the defendant's advantage, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to charge by information rather than by indictment is not 
inconsistent with the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause. 
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ever they decide which of a number of possible crimes to charge, 
and particularly when they engage in plea bargaining prior to the 
filing of an indictment or information, they are making discre-
tionary decisions that will limit the court's sentencing power.238 
Exercise of this discretionary power in the contempt situation 
would be merely a recognition that there are two types of criminal 
contempts-infamous and noninfam.ous;239 it would be as if there 
were two contempt statutes, one with no maximum penalty and 
one with a maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment.240 Since 
the elements of both types of contempts are the same, the absence 
of any criteria for distinguishing serious from nonserious contempts 
creates the possibility for arbitrary prosecutorial classification.241 
238. For example, the recent guilty plea by former Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst to a charge of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192, the contempt of Congress statute, 
was based on testimony that was arguably perjurous. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1974, 
at I, col. l (late city ed.). The maximum potential penalty for violating the contempt 
of Congress statute is one year's imprisonment and a SI,000 fine. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). 
Had Mr. Kleindienst been prosecuted for perjury and found guilty, the maximum 
potential penalty would have been five years' imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. 18 
u.s.c. § 1621 (1970). 
239. See note 66 supra and accompanying text. 
240. In United States v. Green, 856 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1958), the C'ourt explicitly 
held that section 401 gives complete discretion over the length of contempt sen-
tences to the judiciary. Of course, Congress could not give the courts power pro-
hibited by the Constitution, and as an abstract proposition, the Supreme Court 
should have no difficulty in holding that Congress has no power to enact a statute 
that both allows courts to impose more than a one-year sentence for an ordinary 
crime and, at the same time, deprives defendants charged with that crime of the 
right to a grand jury indictment. It is.arguably inappropriate, however, for courts to 
require grand jury indictments in serious contempt cases when the right to an indict-
ment is not fundamental to fairness and the granting of the right would appear to 
contravene Congress' specific delegation of complete sentencing discretion to the 
judiciary. , 
There are at least two responses to this congressional intent argument. First, it is 
not clear that Congress intended to vest uulimited sentencing discretion in the courts. 
Rather, as Green suggests, see 356 U.S. at 169, 179-81, it is likely that Congress was 
merely expressing a refusal to regulate the courts' inherent sentencing power, what-
ever its scope may be. In fact, since the Supreme Court has suggested that the con-
gressional power to regulate contempts is a limited one, see note 86 supra, Congress 
may have believed that, even if it wanted to, it could not completely regulate the 
sentencing of contempts. If the sentencing provision in section 401 is merely a recog-
nition of the existence of inherent judicial sentencing power rather than a specific 
delegation of that power, the statutory language offers no basis for objecting to the 
prosecutorial sentencing discretion that would follow from the application of the fifth 
amendment grand jury indictment provision to criminal contempts. Second, even if 
prosecutorial sentencing discretion would contravene congressional intent, the Supreme 
Court has never suggested that the necessity rationale, which justifies the sui generis 
treatment of contempts, extends to the protection of legislative as opposed to judicial 
interests. Thus, congressional intent should not be a valid justification for a judicial 
claim of inherent power to exercise total sentencing discretion. 
241. Several state courts have taken the position that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion to charge under the more severe of two or more criminal statutes proscrib-
ing the same conduct violates the defendant's right to equal protection. See, e.g., 
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) (defendant entitled to be sen-
tenced under less severe statute); State v. Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 
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This problem, however, can be niet only by creating specific maxi-
mum penalties for different types of contumacious conduct. Until 
that is done, prosecutorial discretion to limit sentencing, even if no 
less arbitrary than the present unfettered judicial discretion, at least 
has the potential for preventing the imposition of excessive sen-
tences by judges who may be prone to bias because a contempt 
represents an affront to their authority.242 
2. Alternative Solutions to the Grand Jury Issue 
Despite the lack of necessity for refusing to apply the fifth 
amendment's indictment provision to criminal contempts, the pre-
ceding analysis has recognized that the extent to which a grand jury 
can be expected to act as a shield against unwarranted prosecutions 
is questionable. Rather, the primary benefits (in addition to en-
hancing the appearance of fairness in contempt proceedings) of 
extending the grand jury right to contemnors lie in the collateral 
consequences of such a requirement-namely, the prosecutor's power 
to limit contempt sentences in all proceedings that he initiates and 
the restraints on judicial initiation of contempts punishable by 
more than a year's imprisonment. The judiciary, however, may be 
reluctant to overrule the precedent for evaluating contempt pro-
cedures by standards of due process248 or to surrender any sentenc-
ing discretion to the executive. Moreover, even if the judiciary is 
·willing to allow or promote the initiation of criminal contempts by 
indictment or information on a cas~-by-case basis, it may be un-
willing to yield or limit its power to impose substantial penalties 
(1960) (prosecutor may not choose between negligent homicide and manslaughter 
statute where latter requires more favorable standard of proof). See Comment, Prose-
cutorial Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 U. COLO. L. R.EV. 455, 458-61 
(1971). The Supreme Court, however, has avoided this equal protection issue, see 
Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 135 (1956), and at least one other court has 
found no constitutional barrier to the prosecutor's decision to charge under one of 
two statutes proscribing the same conduct, even when only one of the statutes-the 
one selected-required that upon conviction the defendant be given a mandatory 
minimum sentence. Hutcherson v. United States, 845 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 894 (1965). 
Regardless of the validity of the equal protection claim in other contexts, it should 
have no applicability to the prosecutor's discretionary power to initiate a section 401 
contempt proceeding by information or indictment. Since the penalty, and not the 
method of initiation, determines whether the crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, see 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (misdemeanors may be initiated by indictment), a prosecutor's 
decision to initiate contempt proceedings by indictment will not affect the classification 
of the crime. Cf. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 135 (1956). And since the use of 
an indictment will not require the imposition of any minimum sentence, there is no 
danger of the prosecutor's arbitrary conduct working to the detriment of the defen-
dant. Cf. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965). 
242 See text at notes 97-100 supra. 
243. See text at notes 189-92 supra. 
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in all cases. With the hope of ensuring that possible judicial reluc-
tance to extend the fifth amendment indictment right to criminal 
contempt will not impede efforts to transfer initiating discretion 
from the judiciary to the executive, this subsection ·will suggest and 
discuss several alternative methods of resolving the grand jury issue. 
First, it would of course be possible simply to reaffirm the view 
that contemnors are never entitled to a grand jury indictment. This 
approach-which would not place any limitations on judicial ini-
tiating and sentencing power-offers the least protection against 
potential abuses of the contempt power and is difficult to justify in 
terms of the necessity rationale. It would not, however, prevent the 
judiciary from encouraging or requiring the executive to initiate 
· criminal contempts.244 
Second, if one is concerned only with prosecutorial discretion 
to limit a court's sentencing power, it would be possible for the 
Supreme Court, by amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or perhaps pursuant to its supervisory power,2411 to require 
that all criminal contempts be initiated by indictment. Since the 
criminal contempt power is easily subject to abuse and has in the 
past been used as a device to inhibit dissident political activity,248 
such a requirement may be desirable. Even if the grand jury would 
not be an effective shield, the indictment requirement would en-
hance the appearance of fairness, and the burden of having to seek 
an indictment could restrain overzealous prosecutors. The extent 
of such restraint would be questionable, however; the indictment 
requirement probably would do little to curb the excesses of per-
sonally interested or vindictive prosecutors. In addition, it would 
seem anomalous for the indictment right to exist for all contempts 
when the more fundamental right to a jury trial exists only in cases 
in which the actual sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment. 
Rather than requiring that all criminal contempts be initiated 
by indictment, the Court, by amendment to the Federal Rules or 
pursuant to its supervisory power, could require only that criminal 
contempts initiated by the executive be by indictment.247 Limiting 
the method of executive initiation would eliminate the possibility 
of executive control over sentencing, and the court could justify the 
244. See text at notes 193-204 supra. 
245. See text at notes 194-99 supra. 
246. See text at notes 145-46 supra. 
247. Since there is existing precedent for the proposition that rule 42 does not 
provide the exclusive method for initiating criminal contempts, see cases cited note 
28 supra, reliance on the supervisory power to control the method of initiation when 
rule 42 is not utilized would not have the effect of amending or limiting the scope of 
rule 42. CJ. text at notes 194-99 supra. 
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requirement on this basis, thereby avoiding the apparent incon-
sistency between the scope of the jury trial right and the indictment 
right. In addition, judges could still initiate contempts if the 
executive fails to act. The major disadvantage of this alternative is 
that it may discourage executive initiation of contempts: So long 
as the rule 42 option remains available, a prosecutor who prefers 
the convenience of rule 42 could simply refuse to indict,248 thereby 
forcing the court to initiate proceedings itself or let the contemnor 
remain unpunished. 
Another possible method of resolving the grand jury problem is 
through two types of legislative action. First, as suggested above,249 
Congress could repeal or limit the scope of section 40 I and treat 
various types of contumacious conduct as ordinary criminal offenses 
that could be initiated only by indictment or information. If these 
ordinary criminal offenses contained maximum penalty provisions, 
the indictment question would be resolved: A potential penalty of 
more than a year's imprisonment would entitle the defendant to a 
grand jury indictment. 
Second, instead of or in addition to limiting the courts' initiating 
discretion by narrowing the scope of section 401, Congress could im-
pose a maximum penalty for violations of that section. Since the 
Supreme Court has concluded that criminal contempts are not in-
herently nonpetty, a maximum penalty of no more than a year's 
imprisonment would not appear unreasonable,209 and if the penalty 
were so limited, there would be no basis for granting contemnors the 
right to a grand jury indictment. The question of executive initia-
tion then could be resolved by the types of executive or judicial 
actions suggested previously. 
A decision by Congress to establish a greater maximum penalty 
for violations of section 40 I would not establish the right to an 
indictment in the absence of a decision to make the fifth amend-
ment's indictment guarantee applicable to criminal contempts. Con-
temnors, however, could be granted that right, either through an 
amendment to the Federal Rules or through the Supreme Court's 
exercise of its supervisory power.251 While such action would de-
248. But cf. note 98 & text at note 215 supra. 
249. See text at notes 205-13 supra. 
250. Cf. PROP. FED. CRIM. ConE, supra note 83, § 1341(2) (six-month maximum 
prison term for criminal contempts). 
251. Even though reliance on the supervisory power would in effect amend rule 
42, the congressional action explicitly authorizing a serious penalty would appear to 
represent a legislative judgment that contempts should no longer be viewed as in-
herently nonscrious offenses, and this expression of congressional intent arguably 
would be a sufficient basis to justify use of the Court's supervisory power to require 
January 1975] Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power 535 
prive the judiciary of its formal initiating power, it probably would 
not create the anomaly of making the indictment right more per-
vasive than the jury trial right-a situation that, as noted previ-
ously, would exist if a nonconstitutional right to an indictment 
were extended to criminal contemnors in the absence of any maxi-
mum penalty limitations for violations of section 40 I. The legisla-
tive determination that the penalty may exceed a year's imprison-
ment would represent a judgment that the crime of contempt is not 
a petty offense,252 and the right to trial by jury therefore presumably 
would always apply.25a 
The major difficulty with relying on legislative action to resolve 
or assist in resolving the grand jury issue is uncertainty over the 
extent to which Congress can regulate the contempt power. The 
problems with regard to limiting the substantive scope of section 
401 have already been mentioned.254 With regard to the imposition 
of maximum penalties, the judiciary may view the failure to provide 
for the possibility of serious contempt sanctions as unduly restric-
tive, and if, as a result of the penalty provisions, all coiltemnors 
become entitled to jury trials, the judiciary may view ·the legislation 
as overly burdensome.255 
Potential objections to congressional regulation of contempt 
sentences would perhaps be minimized by enactment of a carefully 
considered statutory scheme that establishes various maximum 
penalties for different types of contumacious conduct. However, 
regardless of the form the legislation might take, hopefully the judi-
ciary would continue to defer to congressional regulation and not 
assert the doctrine of inherent power to invalidate contempt legis-
lation unless it is patently unreasonable.256 
III. CONCLUSION 
The analysis here has attempted to demonstrate (I) that despite 
the judicial rhetoric about inherent power and the sui generis 
that contemnors be given the right to a grand jury indictment. Compare Chelf v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), with text at notes 193-99 supra. 
252. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970) ("Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which 
docs not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months • • • is a petty offense") 
with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 ("[W]hen the legislature has not expressed 
a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which 
may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence 
of the seriousness of the offense"). See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969). 
253. See cases cited note 47 supra. 
254. See text at notes 82-85, 207-10 supra. 
255. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &: 
Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42 (1924), discussed at note 86 supra. 
256. See note 72 supra. 
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nature of criminal contempt, the only substantial difference be-
nveen criminal contempts and other crimes is the method by which 
the proceedings are initiated; (2) that, at least in recalcitrant witness 
cases, the rationale of necessity, which is the basis for the exercise 
of contempt power, does not justify the existence of the unique rule 
42(b) initiating procedures; and (3) that there would be substantial 
benefits from treating rule 42(b) criminal contempts as ordinary 
criminal prosecutions for all purposes. Admittedly, however, there 
are problems in moving from the premise that there is no necessity 
for the unique rule 42(b) initiating procedures in most, if not all, 
criminal contempt cases to some definitive action requiring that 
criminal contempts be treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions. 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court may view complete elimina-
tion of the judiciary's initiating power as involving too great a risk 
that some contemnors may go unpunished. Even if this risk factor 
is discounted, there are other obstacles to the assimilation of crimi-
nal contempts with other crimes. Uncertainty over the extent to 
which the judiciary will permit legislative regulation of the con-
tempt power may make Congress reluctant to limit the scope of 
section 401 or even to provide maximum penalties for violations 
of that section. The Supreme Court may be unwilling to overrule 
the substantial precedent for evaluating contempt procedures by 
standards of due process, and although the Court could eliminate 
the rule 42(b) option through an amendment to the Federal Rules 
or perhaps through the exercise of its supervisory power, it may 
instead prefer to retain rule 42(b) merely to avoid facing the ques-
tion whether granting contemnors the right to a grand jury indict-
ment is appropriate. 
In light of these practical restraints on congressional or Supreme 
Court action to eliminate or restrict the rule 42(b) contempt power, 
probably the most important recommendation made here is that 
prosecutors begin to use and lower court judges to encourage the use 
of the indictment process in criminal contempt cases. There is 
precedent for such a practice. Moreover, reserving rule 42(b) for the 
rare case in which a prosecutor fails to proceed would provide em-
pirical evidence of the extent to which the judiciary may need to 
retain initiating discretion in criminal contempt cases. This evidence 
would provide a sound basis for both Congress and the Supreme 
Court to reassess and clarify the nature and scope of inherent judi-
cial contempt power. 
